CLEAN HELPDESK
Climate, Environment and Nature

Jordan Humanitarian, Inclusion and Protection portfolio review

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Jordan is the fifth-highest ranking country in terms of water stress, with climate change exacerbating aridity as a result of increasing temperatures, reduced/more erratic rainfall patterns, and heightened evaporation, coupled with an unprecedented population increase caused by both natural growth and refugee influx. Changes in weather patterns are already intensifying the hardships faced by vulnerable communities, and refugees in particular. Systematic evidence on the climate vulnerability of refugees is beginning to emerge, but remains limited and weak.

Various forms of socio-economic and political exclusion in Jordan make refugees particularly vulnerable to climate variability and extreme weather events. FCDO Jordan's Humanitarian, Inclusion and Protection (HIP) portfolio, which supports refugees and vulnerable Jordanians, is therefore likely to be delivering both direct and indirect climate resilience benefits for refugees. However, the portfolio is not designed to recognise climate impacts or the resilience building impacts of the support it provides.

This review indicates that current programme documentation needs updating to justify ICF attribution and results tracking. The review also finds that it is unclear whether Syrian refugee populations in Jordan qualify under the UK policy of applying a fixed proportion of 30% ICF to humanitarian programmes. As a result, the review uses three options to estimate the ICF attribution of programmes. It is recommended that FCDO review the options from an internal policy position on ICF attribution in the case of refugee populations from highly climate vulnerable countries.

Strengthening Societal and Economic Resilience in Jordan (SSERJ)

The SSERJ programme has set out a climate rationale in its business case and is ICF eligible, based on its climate resilience building effects. Work is required to better track the climate-related impacts of support, but based on current information, 5–20% of spend on various components could be considered ICF eligible. Potential was identified for further climate-related programming, which could make it possible for up to 35% of the programme budget to qualify as ICF spend. FCDO Jordan could consider devising an ICF justification note (based on this assessment) setting out the rationale for the climate relevance of the programme, agreed ICF percentages, and agreed KPIs that will be reported on.

Building Resilience, Inclusion and Diversity through Girls' Education (BRIDGE)

The BRIDGE programme does not currently include a climate component as part of its rationale and there is limited evidence of climate-related impacts under the current programme. A case could be made for a limited amount of ICF to be attributed to the programme, given that it benefits climate vulnerable refugee children, but this would be based on very limited evidence and therefore quite difficult to defend. The recommendation is therefore to invest in further work to identify how to better integrate climate resilience into future education programming in Jordan, given that BRIDGE is due to end in 2025. Options have been identified in this report.

Jordan Protection Programme (JPP)

JPP specifically supports the most vulnerable refugee populations who are disproportionately affected by climate shocks, water availability and extreme heat. Anecdotal evidence suggests that changing climate or climate events may be creating additional risks in the context of GBV and child protection. In principle these impacts are being partially addressed through the programme. However, they are currently not targeted or reported against and the evidence to attribute GBV to climate impacts is weak. A case for 15–20% ICF attribution can be made, but there are risks with this, since the link is not supported by clear evidence. JPP concludes in March 2025. The limited time left before conclusion has implications for delivering meaningful climate relevant activities that enable ICF eligibility and reporting. There is opportunity to integrate climate change and climate resilience activities within the new protection programme being designed to succeed JPP, and to build ICF relevance from an early stage.

Future programming

Climate risks are increasing in Jordan, and disproportionately affecting refugees, host communities and marginalised groups. Opportunities to integrate climate more systematically into future HIP programming are significant, and additional funding from FCDO and other sources has been identified to take work forward. This will align with various FCDO policies to strengthen the climate resilience of refugees. Where possible, the HIP portfolio could integrate climate risks and climate marginalisation into its selection criteria for the provision of services and support.

GLOSSARY

AAI	Accelerating Access Initiative
BRIDGE	Building Resilience, Inclusion and Diversity through Girls' Education
C&E PrOF	Climate and Environment Programme Operating Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSSF	Comprehensive School Safety Framework
CwD	Children with Disabilities
CRNI	Climate–Refugees Nexus Initiative
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings
GCFF	Global Concessional Financing Facility
GEDSI	Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion
GoJ	Government of Jordan
HIP	Humanitarian, Inclusion and Protection
IBV	Incentive Based Volunteering
ICF	International Climate Fund
IOM	Interntaional Organistaion for Migration
JPP	Jordan Protection Programme
JRF	Jordan River Foundation
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MIS	Management Information System
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
ND-GAIN	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NFE	Non-Formal Education
NSPS	National Social Protection Strategy
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PwDs	People with Disabilities
SRSP	Shock Responsive Social Protection
SSC	Social Security Corporation
SSERJ	Strengthening Societal and Economic Resilience in Jordan
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VAF	Vulnerability Assessment Framework
WFP	World Food Programme

1 INTRODUCTION

This report was commissioned by the FCDO MENA Department, in collaboration with the FCDO Jordan post. The mandate was to review the Humanitarian, Inclusion and Protection (HIP) portfolio in Jordan, identify opportunities to mainstream climate considerations into the programme, and highlight evidence-based opportunities for ICF spend and results.

The current HIP portfolio covers three programmes:

- Programme 301109: Strengthening Societal and Economic Resilience in Jordan (SSERJ);
- Programme 301459: Building Resilience, Inclusion and Diversity through Girls' Education (BRIDGE);
- Programme 301237: Jordan Protection Programme: Support to Vulnerable Refugees and Jordanians (JPP).

In addition to reviewing the HIP portfolio for ICF relevance and spend, this study identifies ways to strengthen the climate impacts and ICF results of each programme. The study also presents recommendations for FCDO Jordan to build climate resilience through future HIP programming, and to support Jordan's Climate–Refugees Nexus Initiative (CRNI). Finally, the study identifies sources of climate finance for HIP and CRNI programmes in Jordan.

When commissioning this study, the FCDO MENA Department noted that neither FCDO policy nor ICF guidance and indicator methodologies have kept pace with the changing context of fragile, conflict-affected settings with a high level of refugee hosting. There is also no established procedure for estimating the percentage of ICF in programmes involving refugees from highly climate vulnerable countries. Moreover, ICF was not designed for humanitarian programmes. Therefore, there are gaps in the policy guidance on attributing spend as ICF in humanitarian programmes in countries facing these challenges. The FCDO MENA Department requested that the review of the Jordan HIP portfolio consider these limitations and identify alternative and reasonable options to overcome these limitations. This would help inform future policy development on ICF.

The study is based on desktop research, documents provided by FCDO, and interviews (see Annex 1). Some interviewees requested anonymity when sharing their perspectives. Therefore, analysis based on perspectives gathered from interviewees has been attributed to 'stakeholder interviews'. Exceptions have been made, where necessary, with some organisations identified in the context of data availability or recommendations.

2 THE CONTEXT OF JORDAN

Jordan's climate ranges from a Mediterranean to a desert climate, although the land is mostly arid. Jordan is one of the higher hazard risk countries in the world, exposed to droughts, floods, heatwaves, increasing temperature and increasing aridity. Climate change induced hazards such as droughts, extreme temperatures and flash floods have almost tripled in Jordan since the 1980s, compared to a doubling worldwide, exposing the population to loss of life, livelihoods and property.

Since the 1960s, annual maximum temperatures have increased by 0.3–1.8 °C, and minimum temperatures have risen by 0.4–2.8°C across climate regions. Annual precipitation has declined by 5–20%, depending on the region. Future climate modelling shows:[1]

- a clear decrease in mean annual precipitation across Jordan and a decrease in the availability of surface water and groundwater (IWMI, 2022);
- a temperature increase of up to 2.5°C by 2030 and 4°C by 2050 (MOENV, 2021);
- an increase in evaporation and evapotranspiration by up to 1 mm per month by 2040 (excluding the Dead Sea), reaching –2.8 mm per month (excluding the Dead Sea) by 2060 (ESCWA, 2022);
- an increase in the number of hot days by 32.5 days per year by 2060;
- increased drought occurrence, length and severity, with Jordan estimated to experience a rise in the frequency of droughts up to 12.8 months per decade by 2060 (ESCWA, 2022); and
- more frequent extreme weather events.

Concerns are rising about the effects of climate change. Most concerning is the already highly critical water shortage. Jordan is currently the fifth-highest ranking country in terms of water stress.[2]

1 See World Bank Group. (2022). Country Climate and Development Report. Available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/7c81ff9b-6f43-5648-be15-b2e2b25d1d33/content and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Adelphi. (2022). Climate risk profile Jordan, available at https://weatheringrisk.org/sites/default/files/document/Climate_Risk_Profile_Jordan.pdf

2 See https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/water-stress-by-country.

2.1 Climate change risks

2.1.1 Decreased precipitation and water scarcity

Jordan's arid climate is characterised by very low precipitation levels, with approximately 90% of the country experiencing minimal rainfall (USAID, 2017) and an average precipitation of 109 mm per year (ESCWA, 2022). Within Jordan, annual precipitation varies, ranging from 30 to 110 mm per year in desert regions and from 320 to 550 mm per year in the north (ESCWA, 2022). The scarcity of rainfall affects the availability of the country's renewable water supply, which now satisfies only two-thirds of the population's water demands (MOWI, 2016). Annual renewable resources are estimated at 100 m^3 per capita, significantly lower than the recognised global absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 m^3 per capita (MOWI, 2016).

Nearly 60% of Jordan's water supply is extracted from ten renewable and two non-renewable groundwater basins (ESCWA, 2022). The overexploitation of groundwater basins exacerbates the challenge, with current extraction levels reaching 160% and 123% of the safe yield for renewable and non-renewable groundwater basins, respectively (ESCWA, 2022). Overextraction is strongly driven by a combination of declining rainfall, rapid population growth, poor water management and low water pricing.[3]

Even though declining water availability is primarily driven by expected population growth rather than climate change, these projections highlight the urgent need for more sustainable management of water resources. Water scarcity, coupled with increasing overuse in several watersheds and aquifers, poses significant risks to various sectors, including agriculture, water resources, infrastructure, public health and biodiversity.

Impacts on agriculture and livelihoods

Agriculture contributes roughly 5% to Jordan's GDP, but is responsible for more than half of Jordan's freshwater consumption and is a major contributor to increasing water stress. Freshwater scarcity is already affecting the agricultural sector and severely limiting agricultural productivity. One analysis suggests that the expected 1%–1.5% rise in water stress could reduce Jordan's annual agricultural Gross Value Added (GVA) by up to 1.2% (nearly US$30m) in 2030.[4]

3 See Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Adelphi. (2022). Climate risk profile Jordan, Available at https://weatheringrisk.org/sites/default/files/document/Climate_Risk_Profile_Jordan.pdf

4 UNICEF Jordan and Economist Impact. (2022). Tapped out: The costs of water stress in Jordan.

The agricultural sector also faces substantial challenges owing to climate-related hazards, such as droughts, extreme temperatures, floods and pest infestations. These threats are exacerbated by irregularities in extensions of the dry season, reduced rainfall during the growing season, and heavy showers or storms during the flowering season (IWMI, 2022). These hazards directly affect agricultural productivity, leading to decreased yields and economic losses for farmers.

These changes affect both rural and urban livelihoods, as well as the overall food security of the country (ESCWA, 2022). For instance, drought impacts are predominantly felt in rain-fed agriculture, which is currently under threat. Research indicates a rise in irrigated land in Jordan, from 27.8% in 1995 to 39.1% in 2016, accompanied by a decline in rain-fed field crop cultivation (MOENV, 2021). In addition, droughts affect the productivity of rangelands, which in turn restricts the growth of pastures essential for livestock grazing, thus adversely affecting milk and meat production.

Furthermore, changes in patterns of precipitation over the past 10 years are described by farmers and pastoralists alike as making it difficult for them to plan their planting and grazing schedules (IWMI, 2022). Also, extreme temperature fluctuations, such as cold and heatwaves, and untimely frosts, have caused damage to large portions of crops, especially fruit trees, reducing productivity and thus the incomes of farmers (IWMI, 2022). With repeated occurrences of drought and growing water scarcity, farmers have increased their reliance on irrigation, which presents an additional challenge. Farmers often resort to digging their own wells (at times illegally) and pumping groundwater needed for crops, which ultimately leads to a lowering of the water table. Often groundwater extraction is uncontrolled.

Moreover, the shifting climate is linked to a rise in the occurrence of pests, invasive species and livestock diseases, which further intensifies challenges in agricultural production (IWMI, 2022). These risks place a significant financial burden on farmers and pastoralists. For example, farmers in Al Zarqa, a major agricultural region, incur high expenses for pumping groundwater and conveying water to their fields, contributing to rising production costs and declining profitability (IWMI, 2022). Farmers are also faced with a decline in production revenue owing to a lack of consumer trust in the quality of products. Specifically, the pollution of the Zarqa River, caused by overflows from upstream wastewater pumping stations, along with leaks from sewer lines and industrial activities along the river's banks, significantly compromises water quality. This pollution undermines consumer trust in the quality of produce from the area (IWMI, 2022).

Human health

Water scarcity poses significant risks for the health and sanitation sector in various ways. In addition, rising temperatures, directly linked to more hot days, i.e., days when the temperature exceeds 35°C, are expected to increase water demand and the risks of disease spread and heat-related illnesses (ESCWA, 2022). The National Ministry of Health has identified the following climate sensitive health issues: airborne and respiratory diseases, waterborne and food-borne diseases, nutrition, vector-borne diseases, heatwaves, and occupational health. The expected decrease in freshwater availability may lead to the consumption of contaminated water, which in turn can increase water and food-related diseases such as diarrhoea. [5]

Impact on marginalised communities

Marginalised communities in Jordan, including rural populations, small-scale farmers and refugees, are disproportionately affected by climate risks. Climate-related hazards will disproportionately effect vulnerable populations such as women, the elderly, children, those with disabilities, and refugee populations, besides worsening socio-economic disparities, presenting obstacles to water access, food security and livelihoods.

With public water supplies unequally distributed and often unreliable, many households frequently experience water scarcity, leading to rationing and reliance on water tankers. Consequently, households must bear additional costs to supplement the water supply, alongside high water tariffs (IWMI, 2022), which unequally affect poorer communities.

Without proper interventions, and with the increasing prices of water, over 90% of low-income households will experience extreme water insecurity by 2100 (Yoon et al., 2021). The water scarcity challenge is amplified by population growth, caused partly by an influx of Syrian refugees since 2011. Public discourse in Jordan takes the view that the Syrian crisis constitutes an added pressure on already scarce water resources, promoting the idea that refugees often ‘waste’ Jordanian resources, which intensifies vulnerabilities and tensions over water resources (Hussein et al., 2020).

5 See Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Adelphi. (2022). Climate risk profile Jordan, Available at https://weatheringrisk.org/sites/default/files/document/Climate_Risk_Profile_Jordan.pdf

While Jordan is considered a relatively food-secure country, with a score of 8.8 on the 2020 global hunger index, challenges persist in terms of food security, particularly in rural areas. In fact, undernourishment has increased from 5% to 10% since the mid-2000s, with 56% of the local population and 89% of refugees being at risk of food insecurity (UNICEF, 2022). The rural population of around 800,000 individuals (World Bank, 2018) experiences the highest poverty levels, with its challenges amplified by the impacts of climate change, since climate change has accelerated desertification and further reduced rain-fed agriculture and livestock production, both key sources of income (IFAD, 2022). Also, vulnerable communities often contemplate transitioning away from agriculture, but are hindered by factors such as cost, access to education or employment opportunities, and skill sets. Youth and women are disproportionately affected by these barriers, given the limited availability of government services in the region, which detrimentally affects their livelihoods (IWMI, 2022).

In addition, extreme weather events such as floods and landslides pose significant risks to human settlements and infrastructure in vulnerable areas, further worsening socio-economic disparities (IWMI 2023). Jordan has witnessed an increased number of flash floods since 2018, which have resulted in loss of lives and infrastructures (ESCWA, 2022). One of the main reasons for the loss of life and infrastructure damage is rapid unplanned urbanisation, coupled with the insufficient capacity of storm water drainage systems (RCCC, 2022).

In addition, increasing flooding of agricultural lands and infrastructure disproportionately affect vulnerable communities. These extreme weather conditions and droughts consequently strain the government’s ability to deliver essential services, including fodder and water (USAID, 2021).

3 JORDAN'S CLIMATE–REFUGEES NEXUS INITIATIVE (CRNI)

3.1 Overview

During the COP27 climate summit in 2022, held in Sharm El Shaikh, His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan launched the Climate–Refugees Nexus Initiative (CRNI) as a global initiative, in view of the disproportionate effect of climate change on low- to middle-income refugee-hosting countries. This initiative sheds light on the interwoven challenges experienced by refugee-hosting countries, notably increased pressure on natural resources, environmental degradation, compromised infrastructure, and the interconnection between climate change and refugees. All of these factors undermine the resilience and adaptive capacities of low- to middle-income refugee-hosting countries in the face of climate change.

The CRNI urges international organisations, investors and climate funds to prioritise refugee-hosting countries in climate hotspots, to enable these countries to take a more proactive role in global efforts toward a low-carbon, climate resilient future. The initiative seeks to follow a holistic approach that enhances societal adaptation and resilience to climate change, benefiting both refugees and host communities. The CRNI focuses on areas of resource security, namely water, energy, food, and the labour market, notably green jobs. This framework could ultimately improve security, stability and economic development globally.

The CRNI marks a milestone in the path towards climate resilience and sustainable development in vulnerable communities worldwide. Its emphasis on improving access to climate finance and tailoring solutions specifically for countries that host refugees highlights its significance in addressing environmental concerns and fostering sustainable long-term development.

3.2 Jordan's refugee situation

Jordan is host to around 730,000 refugees registered with UNHCR, mainly Syrians who fled their country after the civil war of 2011. The refugee population makes up roughly 6% of the population (WFP, 2022). Initially, Syrian refugees were settled in UN-supported camps in Azraq and Zaatari; however, currently 85% of the refugees live in rented accommodation in urban centres such as Amman and Irbid.[6] This has led to a significant increase in the total population of these areas, causing overcrowding and pressure on urban communities. The move to urban areas is driven by the quest for economic opportunities, which is often not satisfied because of a limited number of available jobs, reduced assistance, and the cost of living (IWMI, 2023).

The influx and settlement of refugees has created additional stress on areas that are already weak, exacerbating pre-existing political and socio-economic stressors, and leading to tensions between host communities and refugees.[7] These tensions manifest in competition over natural resources, such as food and water, as well as in unemployment, a housing shortage, and sanitation challenges. With water demand estimated to nearly double by 2045, (RCCC, 2022), and climate change increasing water scarcity, the result can only be an increase in associated tensions – unless targeted interventions are supported to increase water use efficiency and to restore depleted water resources.

The region of Irbid is a good example of these tensions. The area has witnessed increasing flood frequency and intensity that has damaged infrastructure such as schools, sewerage networks and homes (IWMI, 2023). This has further hampered Irbid's capacity to deal with demand from a growing population of both refugees and local people. The 2013 Zaatari refugee camp flood, too, destroyed shelters and infrastructure (RCCC, 2022).

3.3 The climate vulnerability of refugees in Jordan

A UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) socio-economic survey of refugees in camps based on data collected from December 2023 to January 2024 presents evidence of the climate vulnerability of refugees in Jordan.[8] The report found the following:

- Refugees in camps are more vulnerable to climate challenges than refugees in host communities. This heightened vulnerability stems primarily from the poor

6 See https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/jordan

7 See Breulmann, M., Van Afferden, M. & Al-Subeh, A. & Müller, R. (2021). Influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan - effects on the water sector. Available at https://www.ufz.de/export/data/460/249656_2021_Influx%20of%20Syrian%20Refugees%20in%20Jordan%20-%20Effects%20on%20the%20Water%20Sector.pdf

8 UNCHR. (2024). Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-economic survey of refugees in camps, Jordan. June. Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/vulnerability-assessment-framework-socio-economic-survey-refugees-camps-jordan-june-2024

conditions of in-camp shelters, which are often susceptible to leakages and flooding.

- Almost 40% of refugees in camps exhibit varying levels of climate vulnerability: 9% are in a state of stress, 17% are in a state of crisis, and 12% are highly vulnerable and are in a state of emergency. However, 62% of refugees in camps exhibit (relatively) low vulnerability.
- The majority of refugees have recently experienced and been affected by heat, storms and floods; 53% are 'very often' impaired in their daily activities as a result of high temperatures, and only 7% report no prior experience of heat-related impairment of their daily activities.
- In total, 56% of refugees face challenges resulting from storm damage, while 66% have dealt with damage to their shelters caused by floods.
- The majority of refugees in camps (66%) never or rarely have problems accessing drinking water or accessing water for other purposes (70%). However, 10% 'very often' have problems accessing water for drinking, while 12% 'very often' have difficulties accessing water to meet other needs such as cleaning, watering plants, or cooling themselves.
- Perceptions of climate change as an immediate threat are more varied. While more than a quarter of refugees believe that climate change currently affects them strongly (26%), a similar number believe they are only mildly affected (24%), while 4% believe they are not affected at all. One-third of refugees have no knowledge of climate change.

Refugees are also more vulnerable to extreme heat and climate shocks. According to the Jordanian government, an estimated 70% of all agricultural workers in Jordan are refugees.[9] The UNHCR survey notes that the most common sector of work in both the Azraq and Zaatari camps is incentive based volunteering (IBV) (or 'cash for work'). Extreme temperatures and dust are the highest reported workplace hazards for both agricultural and IBV workers.[10] Further, in the absence of air conditioning systems, refugees are also strongly exposed to extreme heat. Temperatures in the Azraq and Zaatari camps repeatedly reach up to 40º C. At the same time, evidence suggests that measures such as the development of drainage and sewerage works has reduced the impact of extreme weather events such as flooding in the Zaatari camp.[11] In addition, both Azraq and Zaatari camps are extensively powered by renewable energy.[12]

9 MoEnv. Agriculture Sector Green Growth National Action Plan 2021–2025. (2020). Amman, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Available at https://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2020/10/20022_Jordan_Agriculture_v07_HL_Web.pdf

10 UNCHR. (2024). Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-economic survey of refugees in camps, Jordan. June. Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/vulnerability-assessment-framework-socio-economic-survey-refugees-camps-jordan-june-2024

11 See Jordan Red Crescent. (2022). Jordan climate fact sheet. Available at https://www.climatecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/RCCC-Country-profiles-Jordan-2022-Final-1.pdf

12 See Jordan Red Crescent. (2022). Jordan climate fact sheet. Available at https://www.climatecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/RCCC-Country-profiles-Jordan-2022-Final-1.pdf

4 METHODOLOGY FOR REVIEW OF HIP PORTFOLIO

4.1 Overview of approach

The approach for this review is based in the FCDO Climate and Environment Programme Operating Framework (C&E PrOF) Guide of May 2021. The C&E PrOF Guide gives guidance on ICF, including how to structure programmes to incorporate ICF and record ICF spend (see xx).It states that the significance of a programme in terms of climate objectives determines the proportion of programme spend that is eligible for ICF. The contribution towards ICF is determined as follows:

- If the programme's principal objective is building resilience to climate change and/or investing in low-carbon development, the programme is 100% ICF eligible.
- If the programme has significant climate change objectives as part of a wider set of objectives, there is the need to list the programme components and estimate the proportion of each component that is delivering results against climate objectives. This could include, for example, the expected proportion of direct cash transfers made in response to climate impacts (rather than other drivers) and the proportion of time devoted to climate issues within a governance or technical assistance programme. The climate finance budgets of the components then need to be added to calculate the programme's ICF spend.

Figure 1: What counts as ICF



Source: FCDO Climate and Environment Programme Operating Framework (PrOF) Guide, May 2021

A reading of the C&E PrOF Guide indicates that for greater ICF attribution, programmes would need to build climate relevant outcomes into their theory of change and consider the measurement of these outcomes. Put simply, the climate risks that the measures are targeting, and the climate benefits of activities that are proposed as climate responsive activities, should be clearly delineated or illustrated. This would involve giving a clear climate rationale, outlining, for example, the climate hazards and the ways in which assistance will build resilience to current and future climate change. The allocation of ICF includes stipulations for reporting. Programmes spending ICF should report against at least one ICF KPI. Reporting against a relevant KPI should be built into the logframe and programme M&E and reported on as part of the Annual Review. Where possible, the ICF KPI should be reported on as a subset of wider project reporting to reduce the time and resources required.

It is worth highlighting that the share of ICF in a programme is estimated through a bottom-up approach, i.e., by estimating the proportion of each component that is delivering results against climate objectives, and then adding the climate finance budgets of the various components to calculate the programme's total climate finance percentage/amount.

4.2 Steps for assessment of programmes

Step 1: As a first step, and in line with the C&E PrOF Guide, this review uses three criteria to determine the eligibility for ICF within programmes:

- Does the programme contain explicit objectives and results on climate change? Are the objectives and results stated in the business case and/or logframe?
- Does the business case consider how climate risks are changing now and in the future?
- How does the programme support adaptation to the effects of climate change and/or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions?

Step 2: For programmes that are ICF eligible, the review determines the current level of ICF spend and the ICF KPIs for the programme to report against. Where it is difficult to determine how programme activities might translate into a well-defined ICF spend allocation, options have been suggested in this review. For programmes that are not ICF eligible, the review determines if a climate-related narrative could be developed in support of ICF eligibility and then apply the same process.

Step 3: As a third step, the review considers opportunities to enhance ICF relevance and increase the share of ICF across the programmes. In identifying options to enhance ICF relevance, three levels of ambition have been considered: low (do minimum on the ToC and logframe), medium (climate good programming that supports climate co-benefits and can be delivered using existing or minimal resources where appropriate) and high (climate stretch programming that emphasise climate co-benefits and will require reallocation of the programme budget to identified activities). It proposes an ICF allocation for the programmes in line with the opportunities identified.

Step 4: As a final step, the review recommends ICF KPIs for the programmes to report on.

4.3 Key considerations for ICF spend

Climate change as a driver for displacement and migration into Jordan

The vast majority of refugees in Jordan are Syrians. FCDO's Building Local Resilience in Syria (BLRS) argues that although the direct cause of humanitarian need in Syria is political, there is evidence that climate change has contributed to the underlying drivers of conflict and displacement.

However, this position is contested. For example, the World Bank notes that while some weather-related events may have aggravated the crisis in Syria by worsening economic conditions and hence generating further social tensions, the roots of the

Syrian conflict go way beyond climate change.[13] As such, the links between climate change, conflict, and conflict-induced displacement are not straightforward. The World Bank also notes that migration and long-term displacement occur because people can no longer make ends meet, usually as a result of a range of circumstances, such as insufficient land available for cultivation, variations in commodity prices, and personal circumstances. All of these are aggravated by climate change. Therefore, the notion of people moving 'because of climate' needs to be treated with caution. Any discussion of the topic should be cognisant of its complexity.[14]

Similarly, others who have conducted systematic interrogations of the claimed links between anthropogenic climate change and the Syrian civil war have established that there is no clear and reliable evidence that anthropogenic climate change was a factor in Syria's pre-civil war drought, that this drought did not cause truly mass migration, and that there is no solid evidence linking migration with the grievances that brought Syrians into the streets in 2011.[15] A previous rapid evidence assessment commissioned by FCDO also found weak supporting evidence in this regard.[16]

Given the differing narratives on the role of climate change as a driver for displacement and the migration of Syrians into Jordan, this analysis of programmes pays specific attention to evidence that establishes the extent to which climate risks are a push factor for the displacement and migration of individuals and families supported by the programmes. Based on evidence collected, it is safe to conclude that climate change is unlikely to contribute more than 10% of the 'push' factors for the migration of Syrian refugees to Jordan.

13 See https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/dev4peace/five-things-consider-climate-refugees-nexus
14 See https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/dev4peace/five-things-consider-climate-refugees-nexus
15 See https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629816301822
16 See https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60e6d74e8fa8f50c7ba9b3f4/Rapid_evidence_assessment_of_climate_change_impacts_on_migration.odt

Climate change as a driver of Jordan's challenges

As noted by FCDO,[17] water shortages, energy supply challenges and higher rates of unemployment are longstanding issues in Jordan. Even prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan had a history of economic constraints and structural threats to its environment and natural resource management. It has long been a resource-poor country with limited access to water, oil and other natural resources. Large budget deficits and high unemployment in Jordan also predate the arrival of Syrian refugees. For instance, Jordan had a high rate of unemployment even during a period of high economic growth (2005 to 2009), indicating that unemployment in Jordan is a structural labour market issue. FCDO concluded that hosting refugees has added to existing structural challenges in Jordan but is not the principal driver of many of Jordan's challenges.

Other research also notes that tension over water was present long before the arrival of refugees, owing to issues such as drought, transboundary water resources tensions, water mismanagement and an inefficient agricultural sector.[18]

The climate vulnerability of refugee populations

Given the differing narratives on the source of Jordan's challenges in the hosting of refugees, the analysis of programmes has paid special attention to evidence that might establish the extent to which climate change is a driver of vulnerability for programme beneficiaries, or the problem that the programme is addressing.

The UNHCR survey presents some evidence to this end. The survey covered sampled families from UNHCR's ProGres registration database, all four villages in Azraq and the 12 districts in Zaatari camp. According to the UNHCR survey, over 85% of Syrians live outside refugee camps in rented accommodation.[19] The indicates that the survey provides a snapshot of the climate vulnerability of refugees, and that the evidence is not conclusive.

Nevertheless, the survey does show that refugee populations

1. have higher vulnerability to extreme heat and climate shocks in Jordan;
2. have limited coping strategies, which often include working in high climate risk areas, such as agriculture, where extreme heat and water scarcity place them under additional climate stress;
3. are adding to already critical water stress in host communities, although there is limited evidence of refugees contributing directly to environmentally damaging coping strategies.

17 See https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/120321/default/

18 See, for example, Breulmann, M., Van Afferden, M. & Al-Subeh, A. & Müller, R. (2021). Influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan: Effects on the water sector. Available at https://www.ufz.de/export/data/460/249656_2021_Influx%20of%20Syrian%20Refugees%20in%20Jordan%20-%20Effects%20on%20the%20Water%20Sector.pdf

19 See https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/jordan

ICF attribution to programmes targeting the Syrian refugee population in Jordan

Consideration has been given to the UK policy of applying a fixed proportion of 30% ICF to humanitarian programmes. However, this policy applies to the 10% of countries that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, based on the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index, applied both retrospectively and for future humanitarian spending.[20] In 2021, Jordan ranked 74 on the ND-Gain Index,[21] which measures countries' vulnerability to climate change in combination with their readiness to improve resilience. According to the ND-GAIN Index, Jordan is not amongst the 10% of countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. As a result, support for Syrian refugees in Jordan does not automatically qualify for 30% ICF attribution.

However, the ND-GAIN Index gives a view of climate vulnerability from a national perspective and does not accurately represent the climate vulnerability of the refugee populations and their recipient communities, which humanitarian programmes including FCDO Jordan's HIP portfolio target. The ND-GAIN Index was also not designed to direct ICF spend in contexts with high humanitarian needs. Finally, the ranking of countries on the index is not static and changes annually. As a result, and in line with the FCDO MENA Department's request to find approaches that are reasonable for attributing spending under humanitarian programmes in refugee hosting settings, a tailored approach to ICF is proposed, as set out below.

- Option 1: High case

There is a case for applying the '30% rule', the FCAS rule for ICF to the programmes targeting the Syrian refugee population in Jordan that receive FCDO support,22 given that they are significantly more climate vulnerable than the general population, and given the emerging evidence from UNHCR VAF surveys on the climate vulnerability of refugees. However, the 30% default approach to determine ICF spend is a relatively high-risk option, unless supported by additional analysis. This is because the UNHCR survey is based on a sample size, it covers refugees other than Syrians, and it is difficult to directly correlate the survey to the beneficiaries of the HIP programmes.

- Option 2: Medium case

The available evidence suggests that the Syrian refugee caseloads are likely to be more climate vulnerable than the general Jordanian population, but less vulnerable than the 'equivalent' population in Syria. Emerging evidence also indicates the extent to which refugees are climate vulnerable. This provides a basis for an ICF allocation percentage based on:

20 See https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-version/uk-aids-international-climate-finance-commitments/
21 See https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/
22 Based on similar caseloads in FCDO programmes in Syria. For example, the Building Local Resilience in Syria programme has identified climate spend as between 28% and 32%.

- the principle of ensuring that fragile and conflict affected, climate vulnerable populations (including displaced populations) should receive climate finance regardless of location;
- the fact that their vulnerability to all shocks, including climate shocks, has increased as a result of being displaced and losing access to social and economic networks that would otherwise increase their resilience;
- the fact that responses providing assistance to these populations are designed to prevent further loss of resilience and help them recover and reduce their vulnerability in the longer term, and are therefore demonstrating resilience building impacts.

As noted earlier, there is no established procedure for estimating the percentage of ICF for programmes working with refugee populations from highly climate vulnerable countries. Therefore, this case proposes that the climate vulnerability of refugees lies between the climate vulnerability of that of Syria and Jordan. The suggested approach is to base the ICF percentage on the predicted ND-GAIN score and to make an adjustment to account for the vulnerability of refugees.

A simple average of the ND-GAIN scores of Jordan and Syria gives an ICF percentage of 15% (see Table 1). Adjusting this to account for the additional vulnerability faced by Syrian refugees results in a proposed 15–20% ICF allocation. It is recommended that this approach be reviewed and agreed on within FCDO to ensure it is consistent with wider ICF policy on support for FCAS.

Table 1: Average ND-GAIN score for Syria and Jordan and related ICF reference

ND Gain assessment	Rank	ND Gain	ICF
Syria	156	38.03	30%
Jordan	74	52.00	0
'Average' ND gain	115	45.015	15%

- Option 3: Low case

This case only accepts components as ICF where there is (or could be) a direct attribution to climate results. Where evidence is available, it uses the evidence to propose the ICF spend. Where no evidence is found, this case assumes that under 5% of the current spend is ICF eligible.

5 ANALYSIS OF SSERJ (STRENGTHENING SOCIETAL AND ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN JORDAN)

5.1 Programme overview

Specific objectives	Build an inclusive and sustainable social safety net system
Implementation period	March 2022 – April 2027
Budget	£95 million
Implementing partner(s)	International Labour Organisation (ILO), Social Security Corporation of Jordan (SSC), Development Pathways (DP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP)
Share of ICF as per original business case	Nil

SSERJ aims to build an inclusive and sustainable social safety net system in Jordan. It aims to do this through formalisation of the economy, the prioritisation of a gender sensitive and shock responsive social system, and the promotion of greater alignment between the humanitarian and development systems. SSERJ involves the provision of financial assistance to the Government of Jordan, technical assistance for both policy development and system strengthening, and the provision of cash assistance to vulnerable refugees.

SSERJ is built around the components of social protection and humanitarian assistance. The social protection component promotes formalisation in the most vulnerable sectors in the Jordanian economy by providing social insurance coverage rewards and subsidising the social security contributions of Jordanian and non-Jordanian workers, including refugees, to promote their registration and participation in Jordan's state-owned Social Security Corporation (SSC). It comprises four sub-components (listed as 1 to 4 below).

The humanitarian assistance component builds on a previous humanitarian cash assistance programme that was supported by the UK and concluded in March 2024. Commencing in April 2024, humanitarian assistance involves five components (listed as 5 to 9 below). While financing for FY 24–25 for humanitarian assistance is

approved, financing for FY 25–26 will be subject to the outcome of the subsequent spending rounds (i.e., spending from FY 25–26 onwards).

Following the addition of the humanitarian assistance component to the programme in July 2023, the theory of change (ToC) for SSERJ was updated to align the humanitarian cash assistance, economic inclusion and social protection components.

The sub-components of SSERJ are as follows:

Social protection component

- *Sub-component 1: Strengthening the social safety net system*. This component involves the provision of financial assistance to extend social insurance coverage to excluded and vulnerable informal workers, both Jordanians and non-Jordanians, through the Estidama++ project of the SSC. The funding for this sub-component was planned to last for two years. The approach to financial support for the remainder of the programme is currently under discussion.
- *Sub-component 2: Strengthening the link between contributory and non-contributory social protection systems*. This component is designed to support regulatory and administrative changes and the extension of SSC coverage as part of a broader formalisation agenda. This agenda includes the development of a national model to subsidise the contributions of vulnerable workers. The component involves support for the National Unified Registry (NUR) to go beyond acting as a targeting tool to becoming a register of recipients of various forms of transfers and improving the National Aid Fund (NAF)'s Management Information System. NAF is Jordan's primary social assistance provider.
- *Sub-component 3: Promoting alignment between humanitarian and national social protection systems*. This component involves the provision of technical assistance in order to deliver a comprehensive, inclusive and shock responsive national social protection system that is better aligned with the humanitarian response. This component also aims to promote alignment between social assistance and social insurance programmes.
- *Sub-component 4: Influencing policies on social protection*. This component involves the creation of evidence and data to strengthen and influence policy dialogue on social protection. It aims to increase public awareness of social protection, thereby generating the demand for an accountable social protection system.

Humanitarian assistance component

- *Sub-component 5: Cash assistance for food to vulnerable populations*. This involves the provision of unconditional cash-based monthly food assistance to vulnerable refugees in camps and host communities through the World Food Programme (WFP).
- *Sub-component 6: Multi-purpose cash assistance to vulnerable populations*. This component targets the provision of multi-purpose cash assistance through UNHCR and WFP to vulnerable refugees living in camps and in host communities.
- *Sub-component 7: Building the evidence base on the economic inclusion of refugees*. This component is aimed at building a better understanding of the political economy context in Jordan with regard to the economic inclusion of refugees through better access to the labour market.
- *Sub-component 8: Pilot on the skills-based economic inclusion of refugees*. This component aims to foster the self-reliance of refugees by facilitating an interagency two-way referral system for refugee job matching.
- *Component 9: TA to UNHCR*. This component involves the secondment of two FCDO experts to UNHCR Jordan to provide capacity support for research and analysis.

5.2 ICF eligibility

Findings

- The programme is ICF eligible as per the C&E PrOF Guide.

Does the programme contain explicit objectives and results on climate change? Are the objectives and results stated in the business case and/or logframe?

The business case is explicit in stating that the aims of the SSERJ are to improve the climate resilience of vulnerable households through humanitarian cash transfers, and in supporting the integration of climate risks in the selection criteria and targeting indicators for social protection. The business case notes that SSERJ aims to make the national social protection system responsive to climate shocks.

The business case of the ToC focuses on the social protection component and notes that the absence of environmental vulnerability considerations in the social protection offered is a problem that SSERJ aims to address. The programme outcome targets a shock responsive social protection system, and the programme impact targets greater societal resilience. However, neither the outcome nor the impact is explicit about climate-related objectives. Climate shocks and climate resilience remain implicit at these levels of the ToC. A review of the social protection component indicates that climate relevant objectives and results are not explicitly covered under any component. The objectives and results for sub-component 3 refer to Shock

Responsive Social Protection (SRSP) but response to climate shocks is not made explicit in the results or in the indicators.

The July 2023 addendum to the business case reiterates that SSERJ seeks to build a system that can help all those in need and respond to any future crisis, such as Covid, climate shocks or natural disasters. It adds that strengthening Jordan's capability to provide shock responsive support to vulnerable people will enhance its climate resilience and ability to deal with shocks. In adding the humanitarian assistance component to the SSERJ, it notes that unearmarked humanitarian cash assistance to vulnerable refugees living in camps and in host communities will enhance their resilience, including to climate shocks. However, the addendum to the ToC makes no reference to climate shocks or climate resilience at any level.

Does the business case consider how climate risks are changing now and in the future?

The business case notes that Jordan is vulnerable to climate change, emphasising two main risks:

First, it notes that climate change poses a risk to water security and will have related future impacts. It states that Jordan could run out of groundwater in 20 years and parts of Jordan may become uninhabitable in the long term. As such, climate change will exacerbate water scarcity, thereby prompting increases in water tariffs and adversely affecting economic diversification and growth. This will lead to higher food import dependency and therefore exposure to exogenous food shocks.

Second, it notes that rising average annual temperatures in the Middle East are likely to lead to a decrease in rainfall, an increase in flash-flooding, and an increase in the length and frequency of heatwaves. The resulting increase in water scarcity and energy demand will increase existing pressure on economic and political stability, increasing risks of conflict. Therefore, the business case notes the need for mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable.

How does the programme support adaptation to the effects of climate change and/or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions?

A review of the business case and the addendum to the business case indicates that the programme aims to build climate resilience under four sub-components, viz., Components 3, 4, 5 and 6.

- Under Component 3, the programme targets technical support to NAF and Jordan's Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) for the implementation of an inclusive SRSP pillar within the framework of the Jordan's National Social Protection Strategy 2019-2025 (NSPS), making SRSP and NSPS responsive to climate shocks. The business case notes that the NSPS makes no reference to environmental vulnerability. SRSP is also an undeveloped and under-resourced area in Jordan. A reading of the business case suggests that the programme will

support the development and inclusion of climate vulnerability indicators in delivering SRSP.

- Under Component 4, the programme targets the building of an evidence base and general awareness to influence policy dialogue on social protection.
- Under Components 5 and 6, the programme intends to deliver humanitarian cash assistance to increase the resilience of vulnerable refugees living in camps and in host communities. The definition of resilience as per the business case includes resilience to climate shocks.

In addition, given that social protection is a mechanism to protect those most vulnerable to climate shocks and stresses, the programme opens the opportunity to build climate resilience through social protection.

5.3 Review for current ICF spend

Findings:

- There is a need to increase the evidence base to establish that the social protection component of SSERJ builds the climate resilience of beneficiaries.
- Climate vulnerability is not a direct consideration in the provision of cash assistance at present.
- No evidence is currently being collected by delivery partners to establish how cash transfers are supporting refugees to graduate out of climate vulnerability.
- Evidence suggests that the beneficiaries do not resort to environmentally harmful coping strategies in the absence of cash assistance.
- Some components are not eligible for ICF under current FCDO requirements.
- There may be reputational risks for FCDO for tagging some programme activities as ICF.
- A range of options have been recommended to support FCDO to establish the ICF relevance and potential ICF spend for the programme.

Given that the programme makes provision for building climate resilience under both the social protection and the humanitarian assistance components, a detailed review of both components was undertaken to identify activities that could qualify as ICF eligible. In addition, the review examines whether the programme is delivering unintended climate benefits or climate co-benefits that could qualify for ICF.

5.3.1 Social protection component

Sub-component 1: Strengthening the social safety net system

This sub-component involves the provision of short-term income support and subsidies for social security contributions through Estidama++. Estidama++ addresses structural gaps in social security coverage with a focus on vulnerable informal workers that were left out of the Covid-19 national social protection response in Jordan. It targets unregistered informal workers, including refugees and

migrants, who fall through social protection gaps, in two areas: wage workers in micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and self-employed workers. A review of FCDO's 2023 annual report for the programme indicates that wage workers come from sectors such as agriculture and construction, while self-employed workers include taxi drivers, tour guides, and wholesale and retail trade workers, amongst others. The expected outcome of Estidama++ is the availability of unemployment insurance and other core social security benefits.

Documents and interviews suggest that vulnerability to climate shocks and stresses is not a criterion for the selection of beneficiary workers. Climate resilience is also not a stated outcome for Estidama++, in the sense that the objective is not, ultimately, to graduate beneficiaries out of climate vulnerability. No evidence is available under the programme that would establish the climate vulnerability of beneficiaries, or the share of beneficiaries who may be climate vulnerable. This is because this has not been a requirement or a motivation in the programme. However, interviewees noted that workers benefitting from Estidama++ are likely to be climate vulnerable for the following reasons:

- The workers are from the informal sector and relatively low-income earners, and therefore extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change, since higher temperatures and more intense weather events will cause direct physical harm and contribute to ill-health. Workers in informal work arrangements who lack access to social protection are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of heat stress on livelihoods.
- By nature, the agriculture sector is vulnerable to climate variability. As a result, agricultural workers covered by the programme are climate vulnerable in the sense that their incomes and jobs are at risk from climate change.
- The absence of social protection means that climate shocks and stresses risk pushing these workers further into poverty,[23] leading to negative coping strategies such as taking children out of education. This would naturally affect their ability to cope with future climate shocks and stresses.

An argument can therefore be made that by strengthening the social safety net system for unregistered informal workers, this sub-component increases the resilience of beneficiaries to current climate shocks and stresses, enabling them to better cope with future climate shocks and stresses. This argument supports the rationale that Estidama++ builds climate resilience, defined in this case as the absorptive capacity of beneficiaries (see Box 1).

23 The informal economy tends to be characterised by high levels of poverty.

Box 1: Dimensions of climate resilience used in UK ICF KPI 4

UK ICF indicators define climate resilience as building adaptive, anticipatory and absorptive capacities. These capacities are defined under ICF KPI 4, which aims to measure the number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF.

Adaptive capacity is the ability of social systems to adapt to multiple, long-term and future climate change risks, and also to learn and adjust after a disaster. It is the capacity to take deliberate and planned decisions to achieve a desired state, even when conditions have changed or are about to change. An example is farmers diversifying the crops they grow in order to reduce vulnerability to specific kinds of bad weather or pests.

Anticipatory capacity is the ability of social systems to anticipate and reduce the impact of climate variability and extremes through preparedness and planning. An example is cultivating mangroves and building sea walls to protect a coastal zone from storms and sea level rise.

Absorptive capacity is the ability of social systems to absorb and cope with the impacts of climate variability and extremes. It is concerned principally with functional persistence; that is, the ability of a system to bear and endure the impacts of climate extremes. For example, the ability of communities to access and deploy tangible assets such as savings and intangible assets such as social networks to help them survive intensive shocks and maintain levels of wellbeing.

Notably, the November 2023 UK White Paper on International Development[24] puts social protection at the heart of climate efforts. The White Paper emphasises the role of social protection in tackling risks, building resilience, responding to shocks, promoting long-term adaptation, and assisting with livelihood transitions in the context of a changing climate. The COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace[25] also states that shock responsive and inclusive social protection systems (which target the most vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations and communities) build resilience in the context of climate change in situations of fragility and severe humanitarian need. However, it is unclear if the reference in both documents is to all social protection schemes or to schemes that have stated objectives and results for strengthening coping capacities and the self-reliance of vulnerable climate-affected individuals and communities. No FCDO guidelines were found to establish the types of social protection programmes that qualify under the November 2023 UK White Paper.

In theory, the rationale of building the absorptive capacity of beneficiaries as per the UK's ICF indicators, supported by the November 2023 UK White Paper on International Development and the COP28 Declaration, would make this sub-component entirely ICF eligible. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to report this against ICF indicators for the following reasons:

24 Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6576f37e48d7b7001357ca5b/international-development-in-a-contested-world-ending-extreme-poverty-and-tackling-climate-change.pdf

25 Jordan is a signatory to this declaration. Available at https://www.cop28.com/en/cop28-declaration-on-climate-relief-recovery-and-peace

- The business case for SSERJ identifies how climate risks are changing now and in the future. However, Estidama++, as an intervention, is not currently aimed at improving the wellbeing of the population with these climate risks in mind. It is, of course, likely that climate resilience benefits are unitentionally being delivered, but currently they are not targeted or tracked.
- Estidama++ is not set up with climate risk (current or future) factored into its design or outcomes. Interviewees confirmed that the intervention is currently not structured to address climate change related needs and challenges. The indirect and distant linkages make the interconnectivity between climate risks and the social assistance offered difficult to explain and justify (see Box 2). It is also not evident that Estidama++ has the ability to deliver increased climate resilience in the future.
- ICF KPI 4 measures the number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF. Reporting on this measure mandates the exclusion of individuals if a programme was not affiliated with ICF during the business case approval process, or does not specifically address resilience to climate change (as opposed to other kinds of shocks and stresses). As noted above, Estidama++ addresses non-climate stresses.
- No evidence was found from delivery partners' reporting to establish the extent to which beneficiaries are climate vulnerable. Where refugees are beneficiaries of Estidama++, no evidence was found to establish if climate change was the push factor for displacement and migration into Jordan.
- Neither Estidama++ nor SSERJ measures climate vulnerability outcomes. Therefore, the strength of evidence for building absorptive capacity remains weak. No evidence was found from delivery partners' reporting in this regard.

Box 2: ICF KPI4 guidelines for programmes that do not specifically address climate resilience

ICF KPI 4 methodology provides guidance on conditions under which programmes that do not specifically address resilience to climate change qualify for ICF. The methodology notes that a Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) programme can count as contributing to climate resilience. However, to qualify as building climate resilience, an integrated strategy is expected, along with evidence that the WASH programme specifically addresses either observed or predicted water insecurity caused in part by climate change. If the programme is simply doing quick-impact water/sanitation infrastructure projects, that is probably insufficient to qualify as building climate resilience.

For Estidama++ to contribute to KPI 4, explicit recognition of climate resilience benefits would need to be included in the programme; for example, through an ICF justification note that sets out the rationale for resilience building, and the expected results. It would also need to include ICF KPI 4 in the logframe and annual reporting.

Sub-component 2: Strengthening the link between contributory and non-contributory social protection systems

A review of the SERJJ annual report indicates that this sub-component has delivered three outputs. The first pertains to the delivery of administrative changes in the SSC to facilitate the extension of coverage to vulnerable workers, based on the principle of equality of treatment and/or contribution subsidies. Specifically, it supported the following:

- The establishment of internal regulations within the SSC concerning the implementation of Estidama++, which cover, inter alia, registration, payments, and a grievance redress mechanism;
- SSC's engagements with the NAF to improve the transition of beneficiaries from the NAF to SSC;
- An investigation into the provision of private health insurance to Estidama++ beneficiaries.

The second output pertains to studies that built the evidence base to support the development of a social security system. The studies included the following:

- A review of legislative and policy coherence for the extension of social security, to understand how this incentivises or disincentives workers from participating in social security;
- Documentation on the experiences of extended social security to Syrian refugees;
- The development of a monitoring, evaluation, accountability, research and learning plan for building evidence from SSERJ, as well as good practices and lessons learned.

The third output pertains to a training session for SSC staff to improve their implementation of Estidama++ activities.

A review of this component identified no climate relevant activities, i.e., the activities do not target climate resilience as an outcome. Interviewees confirmed that the intervention is currently not structured to address climate change related needs and challenges. Nevertheless, some interviewees noted that the strengthening of core social protection systems in Jordan would not only lay the foundation for a shock responsive social protection system, but also enhance the resilience of the social security system, enabling it to continue routine functioning even in the face of climate risks. However, the evidence to establish these outcomes currently remains insufficient. It could be developed if climate were targeted as an area of development in Jordan's social protection system.

Sub-component 3: Promoting alignment between humanitarian and national social protection and

Sub-component 4: Influencing policies on social protection

The TA under these two components is largely demand led by the GoJ. Following engagements with GoJ to determine the wider scope of activities, Development

Pathways was contracted in June 2023 to deliver the TA that forms the core of these components. The TA is intended to advance efforts to build a comprehensive social protection system in Jordan. It is built on two pillars: expanding the national social protection system to secure social security for everyone, and modernising/professionalising the social security system. The TA intends to promote greater gender equality, women's empowerment, and the inclusion of persons with disabilities and other at-risk groups within the national social protection system. The TA takes the form of the Shamil Technical Assistance Project, and commenced in March 2024.

Some interviewees pointed out that social protection systems reduce people's underlying vulnerability to climate change in the following ways: by directly reducing income poverty; by contributing to human development and productive outcomes, such as education, health and productive livelihoods; and by supporting increased equity, gender equality, inclusion and social justice. They also noted that strengthening routine social protection is key to building resilience and a precursor for shock responsiveness. Design elements can be implemented to adapt the system to different types of potential shocks. Interviewees also noted that the establishment of a comprehensive and effective social protection system in Jordan would lay the foundation for a social protection system that feeds into the national platform for disaster risk reduction – the National Center for Security and Crises Management. In this way it would enable effective responses to climate shocks. The design of the trigger system of climate shocks rests with the National Crisis Centre and is not part of the TA.

The idea of establishing comprehensive social protection systems as a precursor to a large-scale national cash-based climate shock response points to the building of anticipatory and absorptive capacities (see Box 1). Nevertheless, it may be difficult to report this against ICF indicators for the following reasons:

- The main objective of the TA remains the establishment of a comprehensive social protection system;
- The outcome of these components in terms of a climate-oriented shock responsive social protection (SRSP) is not guaranteed at this stage.

Options for current ICF spend

Based on the above discussion, there are several options for current ICF spend in SSERJ's social protection component, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Options for ICF spend for SSERJ social protection component

Sub-component	Options for ICF spend	Rationale	Potential ICF KPI for reporting	Strength of evidence within Programme	Recommendation to FCDO
Sub-component 1	100% of funding going to this component	Building absorptive capacity	KPI 1: People supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF Would need to be explicitly referenced in component objectives, logframe and results (for example, % of beneficiaries)	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	Not recommended (reputational risks) (high risk)

Sub-component	Options for ICF spend	Rationale	Potential ICF KPI for reporting	Strength of evidence within Programme	Recommendation to FCDO
Sub-component 1	High case or medium case	Building absorptive capacity	KPI 1: People supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF Would need to be explicitly referenced in component objectives, logframe and results (for example, % of beneficiaries) as part of programme	Limited Would need tracking	High case not recommended, as a relatively high risk option Medium case possible, if approach is agreed as interim policy, given the lack of FCDO policy guidelines
	Low case	Challenges associated with ICF tagging Not eligible, as per requirements of ICF KPI 4 to exclude beneficiaries if the programme does not specifically address resilience to climate change	KPI 1: People supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF Would need to be explicitly referenced in component objectives, logframe and results (for example, % of beneficiaries) as part of programme	Limited Would need tracking	ICF spend at 5% of funding going to this component

Sub-component	Options for ICF spend	Rationale	Potential ICF KPI for reporting	Strength of evidence within Programme	Recommendation to FCDO
Sub-component 2	No ICF spend	No resilience capacity built	N/A	N/A	Preferable approach
Sub-components 3 & 4	High case or medium case	Building anticipatory and absorptive capacity Potential for the establishment of an SRSP that is responsive to climate shocks	ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance KPI 15: Extent to which ICF intervention is likely to lead to transformational change (Score 3*)	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	High case not recommended, as relatively high risk option. Medium case possible, if approach is agreed as interim policy, given the lack of FCDO policy guidelines
	Low case	Building anticipatory and absorptive capacity Potential for the establishment of an SRSP that is responsive to climate shocks, but outcome not guaranteed Difficult to report against ICF indicators	ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance KPI 15: Extent to which ICF intervention is likely to lead to transformational change (Score 3*)	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	ICF spend at 5% of funding going to this component

* ICF KPI 15 requires an overall assessment score of between 1 and 5, indicating the likelihood of transformational change linked to the ICF support. A score of 3 indicates that there is not enough evidence yet to assess, or that the balance of evidence is inconclusive.

5.3.2 Humanitarian assistance component

Sub-component 5: Cash assistance for food to vulnerable populations

This sub-component involves unconditional life-saving cash-based food assistance to families (not individuals) who meet the basic food and nutrition needs of vulnerable populations in Jordan, including refugees. Following funding shortfalls, WFP, jointly with UNHCR, implemented a retargeting exercise in July 2023, with the result that the number of beneficiaries eligible for food assistance reduced by 12%. Almost all beneficiaries who have now been excluded are refugees.

The criteria for the selection of beneficiaries involved lack of income-earning capacity and malnutrition. Those who remain on the programme are almost all refugees living below the abject poverty line, or have a member with moderate or severe acute malnutrition, or have demographic features that make them entirely dependent on assistance. The beneficiaries include a large portion of elderly refugees, people with disabilities, and single woman-headed households who had limited productive capacity and faced additional barriers in accessing employment opportunities, making them even more dependent on humanitarian assistance.

Documents and interviews suggest that vulnerability to climate shocks and stresses is not a criterion for the provision of food assistance. Some interviewees noted that in general, humanitarian needs are highest amongst vulnerable people who are also most affected by climate change. No evidence was found from delivery partners' reporting to establish the extent to which climate shocks and stresses are a driver of food insecurity for the recipients of food assistance, or whether climate change was an important push factor in their displacement or migration. UNHCR has started covering climate vulnerability in its quarterly assessment of the socio-economic conditions of refugees in Jordan – the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF). The questions asked in the assessment largely aim to establish current and future vulnerability to climate change. At this stage, the intention is to monitor the refugees' perceptions of climate change. Over time, climate vulnerability may become a standard part of the VAF.

Efforts were made to identify whether food insecurity or the lack of food assistance leads to environmentally harmful coping strategies. Data available from WFP indicates that emergency coping strategies by refugees to food insecurity tend to involve borrowing money to purchase food from non-relatives/friends, buying food on credit, and reducing essential non-food expenditures such as health-related expenditure.[26] Data also indicates that emergency coping strategies by vulnerable Jordanians to food insecurity tend to involve engaging in socially degrading, exploitative, high risk or illegal temporary jobs; sending children, predominantly boys, under the age of 18 to work, and reducing essential non-food expenditure such as health-related expenditure.[27] Data does not indicate environmentally harmful coping strategies in response to food insecurity. This was confirmed during interviews.

Sub-component 6: Multi-purpose cash assistance to vulnerable populations

Cash assistance takes the form of mobile money (electronic wallet or preloaded ATM cards), and is aimed at supporting vulnerable populations to cover their needs such as rent, healthcare, food, and essential items like blankets and heaters in the winter. As with cash assistance for food, cash transfers target families, not individuals.

Documents and interviews suggest that cash transfers are being provided largely in response to the inability of refugees to access employment opportunities. Other vulnerabilities are considered, although climate vulnerability is not a direct consideration. The beneficiary selection is determined through the VAF, which uses data collected during home visits to create vulnerability ratings to identify those who are most vulnerable; using this vulnerability ranking, households are prioritised for assistance, in line with the level of funding available. As noted earlier, UNHCR has started covering climate vulnerability in its quarterly assessment of the socio-economic condition of refugees in Jordan. At this stage, this data is not being used under the VAF as a criterion for beneficiary selection. No evidence was available from delivery partners' reporting that would establish whether climate change was an important push factor in the displacement or migration of refugees.

26 See WFP data and dashboards at https://www.wfp.org/countries/jordan; For example https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a

27 See WFP data and dashboards at https://www.wfp.org/countries/jordan; For example https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a

Nor was any evidence found from delivery partners' reporting that would establish how cash transfers were supporting refugees' graduation out of climate vulnerability. Some interviewees pointed out that the provision of cash assistance enables beneficiaries to acquire assets and increase their savings, which ultimately enables them to escape the poverty trap and become resilient to a range of risks and shocks, including those from climate change. This suggests that cash transfers directly improve absorptive capacity (see Box 1). Other interviewees cautioned against expectations of outcomes on climate resilience. Because of the fungibility of cash, it is assumed that beneficiaries can spend it on meeting their essential needs as they see fit and in ways that cut across sectors. In practice, however, acute needs and the financial distress of beneficiaries, along with the low value of cash transfers, result in beneficiaries using cash to prioritise only a few essential needs. Multi-purpose cash transfers therefore continue to remain lifesaving in nature.

Efforts were also made to identify whether the absence of cash assistance leads to environmentally harmful coping strategies. Data available from WFP indicates that emergency coping strategies include child marriage, begging, accepting degrading, high risk, illegal, or exploitation jobs, and crisis coping strategies include reducing health and education expenditures, withdrawing children from school, and sending children to work.[28] Beneficiaries also resort to purchasing lower quality and quantities of food to make ends meet. No evidence of environmentally harmful coping strategies was identified. This was confirmed during interviews. Anecdotal evidence given during interviews further indicated that environmentally harmful coping strategies are not apparent, even where refugees and vulnerable Jordanians are unable to pay electricity bills or lack access to water. The most common coping strategy in these situations involves saving gas by not cooking, cooking in communities, or not boiling water for drinking purposes.

Some interviewees pointed out that UNHCR is transitioning all refugee households benefitting from cash transfers to mobile wallets. They noted that mobile wallets lower the carbon footprint of cash assistance, since they eliminate the need for beneficiaries to travel to and from ATMs, cash points, or utility bill payment points. Interviewees noted that the travel usually involves the use of buses. Notably, the transition to mobile wallets is occurring across UNCHR's cash programme in Jordan and is not limited to multi-purpose cash assistance supported by SSERJ.

No estimates were available to establish the extent to which the use of mobile wallets reduces the carbon footprint. It is also not known if the savings incurred by households through the elimination of travel expenses is being channelled into other goods or services, and the carbon intensity of such goods and services. The net effect by way of carbon footprint therefore remains unknown.

28 See for example https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000151223/download/?_ga=2.39317923.167664627.1715700660-884737044.1715700660

Sub-component 7: Building the evidence base on the economic inclusion of refugees

As noted earlier, this component is aimed at building a better understanding of the political economy in Jordan in respect of the economic inclusion of refugees. The aim is to uncover avenues for better access to the labour market, and any potential societal grievances or conflicts that may arise from promoting the greater economic inclusion of refugees in Jordan. The rationale for this component is that while extremely vulnerable refugees continue to require humanitarian assistance, other refugees may have the skills and capacities to become self-reliant in the medium term, provided they can access job opportunities.

The component also seeks to understand the socio-political constraints for the economic inclusion of refugees. Climate resilience is neither a driver nor a targeted outcome for this sub-component. It may be argued that opportunities to build the longer-term resilience of refugees by tackling systemic constraints to their participation in the labour market would contribute to their financial empowerment and thus potentially build their adaptive capacity. However, the indirect and distant linkages make the interconnectivity difficult to explain and justify (see also Box 2). The evidence to establish this outcome also remains insufficient.

Sub-component 8: Pilot on the skills-based economic inclusion of refugees

Under this sub-component, SSERJ will support the operationalisation of a management information system (MIS) being developed by WFP to match working-age refugees with jobs,[29] based on their employability profile. The aim is to help them graduate from NAF social assistance. This referral mechanism will support the targeting/recruitment process of all interested actors. The MIS is an outcome of previous work done by WFP to create a data repository with information on refugees' employability, livelihood skills, experience, capacities and aspirations. This employability and skills mapping was conducted with data from NAF beneficiary households.

As with the previous sub-component, the objective of this sub-component is to build the self-reliance of refugees. Climate resilience is neither a driver nor a targeted outcome for this sub-component. It may be argued that the economic inclusion of refugees would contribute to their financial empowerment, potentially building their adaptive capacity. However, the indirect and distant linkages make the interconnectivity difficult to explain and justify (see also Box 2). The evidence to establish this outcome also remains insufficient.

29 Employers include the private sector, UN agencies, NGOs, international funding institutions and development organisations.

Sub-component 9: TA to UNHCR

FCDO has seconded an economic advisor and a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) advisor to UNHCR Jordan. The capacity building being supported for UNHCR Jordan through the secondment of advisors is expected to build the capacity for UNHCR Jordan in respect of all its operations. This includes UNHCR Jordan's ability to deliver, monitor, report and verify on existing climate smart interventions within humanitarian operations, and interventions financed through the UNHCR Climate Resilience Fund in Jordan.

Box 3: Climate resilience interventions within UNHCR operations in Jordan

UNHCR is pursing climate resilience interventions at various level within its operations and programming in Jordan. These include but are not limited to clean energy solutions based on solar power technologies in refugee camps and lowering the environmental footprint of its own operations. UNHCR is also identifying options to mobilise climate finance to build the climate resilience of forcibly displaced people fleeing from or living in climate-vulnerable countries. The recently launched Climate Resilience Fund will facilitate direct climate financing and action to reach refugees, stateless and displaced people as well as their host communities. The fund will be capitalised through grant contributions. Jordan is one of the 22 priority countries covered by this fund.

Source: Interviews conducted for this study and UNHCR Climate Resilience Fund.[30]

Options for current ICF spend

Based on the above discussion, there are several options for current ICF spend in SSERJ's humanitarian assistance component, as shown in Table 3.

30 See https://reporting.unhcr.org/spotlight/climate-action/unhcr-climate-resilience-fund-0

Table 3: Options for ICF spend for SSERJ's humanitarian assistance component

Sub-component	Options for ICF spend	Rationale	Potential ICF KPI for reporting	Strength of evidence	Recommendation to FCDO
Sub-component 5	High case or medium case	Building absorptive capacity	KPI 1: People supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF Would need to be explicitly referenced in component objectives log frame and results (for example, % of beneficiaries)	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	High case not recommended, as a relatively high risk option. Medium case possible if approach is agreed as an interim policy, given the lack of FCDO policy guidelines
	Low case	Building absorptive capacity, but there are challenges associated with ICF tagging, as beneficiaries of cash transfers are not eligible according to requirements under ICF KPI 4	KPI 1: People supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF Would need to be explicitly referenced in component objectives logframe and results (for example, % of beneficiaries)	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	ICF spend at 5% of funding going to this component

Sub-component	Options for ICF spend	Rationale	Potential ICF KPI for reporting	Strength of evidence	Recommendation to FCDO
Sub-component 6	High case or medium case	Building absorptive capacity Lowering carbon footprint of cash transfers	KPI 1: Number of people supported to cope with the effects of climate change or KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF Would need to be explicitly referenced in component objectives logframe and results (% of beneficiaries) included in LF and partners	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	High case not recommended, as a relatively high risk option. Medium case possible if approach is agreed as an interim policy, given the lack of FCDO policy guidelines
	Low case	Lowering carbon footprint of cash transfers, but net effect for carbon footprint of transition to mobile wallets remains unknown Beneficiaries of cash transfers not eligible according to requirements under ICF KPI 4	KPI 6: Tonnes of greenhouse gases reduced or avoided as a result of ICF (tCO2e)	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	<5% of funding going to this component

Sub-component	Options for ICF spend	Rationale	Potential ICF KPI for reporting	Strength of evidence	Recommendation to FCDO
Sub-components 7 & 8	High case or medium case	Building adaptive capacity	ICF TA KPI 2: Number of individuals and organisations informed by ICF TA* ICF KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF	Limited Would need tracking as part of programme	High risk options owing to distant linkages with building adaptive capacity
	No ICF spend	Climate resilience is neither a driver nor a targeted outcome	N/A	N/A	Preferable approach
Sub-component 9	Low case	Providing personnel to augment partner capabilities on programme management, and reporting on compliance standards, including on climate smart interventions	ICF TA KPI 2: Number of individuals and organisations informed by ICF TA	Robust	ICF spend at 5% of funding going to this component

* ICF KPIs typically measure results. To that extent, there is a need to measure the results achieved by the operationalisation of the WFP Management Infromation System (MIS). Since the operationalisation of the MIS will itself not deliver climate relevant outcomes, no ICF KPIs are directly applicable. ICF KPI 4 is the next best option. However, this KPI necessitates resourcing to conduct repeated surveys of the beneficiaries.

5.4 Opportunities to enhance ICF relevance

Findings:

- There is potential for good and smart climate programming under SSERJ.
- Options identified for climate stretch programming could make it possible for up to 35% of the programme budget to qualify as ICF spend. The exact level would depend on the specific activities that are implemented and the exact budget allocated to them.

5.4.1 Programming options

There is potential for good and smart climate programming under both components of SSERJ. Options to this end are presented below. These options will need to be evaluated for feasibility, design and budgetary implications. It is also necessary to assess the cost efficiency of including ICF KPIs, as reporting against these KPIs often requires extensive monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) or evidence. Assessing the feasibility of implementation and budgetary implications is beyond the scope of this report and would need to be undertaken separately. It is possible that some interventions involve trade-offs with lifesaving humanitarian support. Given the funding cuts that agencies such as WFP and UNHCR have experienced in the last year, directing funding away from lifesaving assistance risks exacerbating the vulnerability of the very populations whose climate resilience is prioritised.

Strengthen the climate narrative of programme components. There is scope to review the ToC and logframe to establish whether improving climate resilience is a reasonable expectation. This would also provide the basis for mandating partners to gather data in support of monitoring and reporting requirements of relevant ICF KPIs.

Refine understanding of the climate vulnerability of SSERJ beneficiaries. The Embassy could engage all partners on this programme in gathering information on the climate vulnerability of beneficiaries, including the extent to which climate change was/is a push factor in their displacement, migration or vulnerability. This would enhance analysis of the overlapping nature of vulnerabilities amongst beneficiaries. Specifically, it would be useful to examine how climate events could cause workers to generate less income or to lose income. Some interviewees noted that there is insufficient understanding of the types of climate shocks and stresses that are likely to affect workers in Jordan and how these shocks and stresses would impact their livelihoods and incomes.

Establishing such a baseline through continued data collection would be useful to support a review of ICF relevance and ICF tagging for the completion of the programme. It could also support future social protection interventions and other policy solutions that support workers whose livelihoods are likely to be affected by climate shocks and stresses.

Pilot a climate vulnerable social protection scheme. A review is currently underway for sub-component 1 that involved financial support to Estidama++. One of the objectives of this review is to determine the areas for targeting financial support for the remaining duration of SSERJ. As part of this review, consideration could be given to prioritising climate smart social protection

programmes. One option would be to design a scheme to direct financial support towards those whose livelihoods, health and wellbeing are most affected by water scarcity (as represented by the increasing cost of water and reducing availability).

This could be piloted through the NAF, by integrating climate risk indicators into the targeting of cash transfers or including criteria that target vulnerable people in areas that have experienced climate shocks and stresses in the past two years. This also presents an opportunity to demonstrate how an SRSP could work, and to build climate resilience amongst vulnerable groups in the context of Jordan's worsening water scarcity. FCDO has extensive expertise in this area from previous and ongoing programmes in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, South Sudan and Zambia. Another option would be to integrate seasonal forecasts into the NAF selection criteria each year.

In establishing the risks posed by climate change for Jordan's growing water scarcity for this purpose, it would be necessary to make the distinction between the role of climate change and the limited availability of water resources in Jordan and various structural and proximate factors31 that may be driving water scarcity. It would be simplistic to attribute water scarcity only to the biophysical impacts of climate change without considering the political, economic and historical interactions that define and characterise the water sector in Jordan. The pilot would need to be carefully designed as it is possible for poorly designed social protection programmes to foster maladaptation; i.e., to increase climate risk by encouraging people to stay in unviable areas or livelihoods.

Move away from stand-alone cash programming to cash for work schemes that build community- and household-level climate resilience. Cash for work schemes involve asking that adult beneficiary households earn their payments by working on projects that benefit the community. Communities themselves could identify projects, or projects planned by partners under humanitarian programming could be considered for this purpose. For example, UNHCR is planning an afforestation project that involves creating a green belt between the Azraq town and the Azraq refugee camp. The green belt is intended to be a source of livelihoods for refugees and host communities while delivering environmental benefits such as arresting the loss of biodiversity. It also has benefits for future spending by FCDO, as mainstreaming the construction and maintenance of climate adaptation and resilience measures into ongoing activities could reduce future emergency allocations or readjustments.

Experience from previous FCDO-supported programmes such as the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Building in South Sudan (HARISS) provide an example of this approach (see Box 4 and Box 5). Experience from PSNP and other programmes, such as in Tanzania, suggest that green public works components under social protection programmes have generally been counted as 90%–100% ICF.

Box 4: FCDO's Productive Safety Net Programme – Phase 4

31 Structural factors here include a society's underlying features, while proximate factors include changes in the political, physical, social or economic environment.

The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is a social protection programme run by the Government of Ethiopia to tackle food insecurity and increase household resilience to drought shocks. It has been going since 2005 and is one of the largest social safety net/transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa.
The PSNP largely delivers cash and/or food transfers in exchange for labour on public works projects such as road rehabilitation, soil conservation and reforestation. FCDO supported PSNP Phase 4, which was part of the Ethiopian Government's response to the increasingly unpredictable weather patterns in the Horn of Africa. These are likely to make traditional low-input crop- and livestock-based livelihoods increasingly vulnerable to long-term shifts in rainfall and temperature, and to increase the incidence of extreme events such as drought and floods. A 2016 review noted that the majority of the 45,000 public works projects completed each year through PSNP public works labour focused on soil and water conservation, using terracing, tree planting and gully control measures to arrest and reverse the effects of rapid runoff and soil erosion on deforested and over-grazed hillsides. Rehabilitated slopes were then 'enclosed', with grazing prohibited and the cutting of wood controlled. This delivered spill-over benefits in terms of the contribution to climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration

Source:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a80539840f0b62305b8a7ee/Ethiopia-PSNP4-Dec-2016.pdf

Box 5: FCDO's Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Building in South Sudan (HARISS) Programme

HARISS was a large-scale, multi-year humanitarian programme (2014/15–2022/23) providing humanitarian assistance and resilience building activities in South Sudan.
The programme aimed to support a shift from short-term assistance to a more flexible, longer-term approach that would increase the resilience of conflict-affected people in the country. The resilience building approach in this programme involved using cash for work schemes to build community- and household-level climate change adaptation measures such as flood defences, environmental regeneration, water retention landscapes, and soil conservation measures. Following the floods of 2019, IOM, which was one of the programme partners, used the cash for work approach to assist flood-affected communities to upgrade their shelters in Agyei administrative area, in order to prevent flood water from entering the huts.

Source: See business case and Annual Review of August 2021 available at
https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/programme/GB-1-204019/documents

Provide vocational training with cash transfers to support climate adaptation. Options include the provision of advice to beneficiaries to ensure or incentivise that cash transfer payments are invested in climate resilience activities; the provision of training to beneficiaries to prevent cash transfers being used for activities that inadvertently harm the environment;[32] and the provision of training and skills development to support beneficiaries to adapt to climate

32 In December 2004, when a 9.2 Richter scale seaquake shook the Indian Ocean, creating 20-metre-high tsunami, waves severely affected the western coast of Aceh, Indonesia. Over 160,000 residents were killed and 120,000 families were left homeless. Cash transfers were given to beneficiary households to enable them to buy construction materials and contract labour themselves. However, this had negative environmental impacts, as the rapid increase in demand for timber resulted in unlicensed and illegal logging. The weak government monitoring system on forest regulation was not able to provide checks and balances. The timber collected was unsustainable, causing further environmental damage to areas already deforested from the direct environmental impacts of the tsunami itself. (See Ochoa et al. (2018). Implications and opportunities for cash transfer programming in humanitarian response. UNEP, LSE, Shelter Cluster and OCHA.) In this instance, early assessment of the cash usage could have resulted in a pivot of part of the programme to providing sustainable building materials.

change. Experience from FCDO's adaptive social protection programme in the G5 Sahel countries and Senegal provides an example of how this can be done (see Box 6).

Box 6: FCDO's Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Programme

The Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (SASPP) strengthened social protection systems in the Sahel to enhance the resilience of poor and vulnerable populations to the impacts of climate change.

Delivered through a World Bank multi-donor trust fund, the ASP programme supported the development of government-led social protection systems to strengthen poor and vulnerable households' ability to anticipate, absorb and recover from climate shocks, by increasing their access to safety nets. In Niger, the programme trained beneficiaries of cash transfers to use cash transfers to intensify irrigated agriculture, thereby helping them adapt to climate change.

Link the shock responsive social protection system to disaster risk financing mechanisms. The November 2023 UK White Paper on International Development notes that strengthened social protection systems should be linked to disaster risk financing mechanisms to anticipate and respond better to future shocks. This is also supported by the COP28 Declaration. The comprehensive social protection system being run through the Shamil Technical Assistance Project is expected to be tax financed. Given the economic challenges that GoJ faces, in particular high public debt, it remains unknown whether social protection will eventually be tax financed. In such a scenario, funding of a climate shock responsive social protection system, even if established through taxes, is questionable. Linking with disaster risk financing mechanisms could therefore be critical.

Advocate for and influence social protection systems to offset the negative welfare impacts of Jordan's transition to a lower carbon and more climate resilient development pathway. The November 2023 UK White Paper on International Development notes that social protection systems should be designed to cushion and compensate people for the adverse impacts of climate change, climate policies and transitions to net zero. A transition away from Jordan's fossil fuel based economy will necessitate policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, protecting the environment, or otherwise managing climate change. The use of social protection systems to support those whose income security is affected by this transition can offset the negative income and labour market impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, thus preventing the increase in vulnerability that would otherwise result from these responses. It is understood that the NSPS is currently going through an update by the Ministery of Social Development and relevant government departments, including the Crisis Center. This update presents an opportunity for such advocacy, including for social protection systems that would support those affected by climate shocks.

Provide evidence from FCDO programmes in support of climate SRSP. Evidence from previous and ongoing FCDO programmes could be systematically synthesised and provided to GoJ to share how to establish a climate shock responsive social protection system. This would also help GoJ to deliver on the NDC to the Paris Agreement. Its NDC notes GoJ's intention to improve the existing social protection system to cope with climate change consequences and

serve Jordanian segments of society, including the poor, orphans, the elderly, abused women and children, among other vulnerable groups and individuals. Relevant programmes could include the Somalia Humanitarian and Resilience Programme (SHARP). Its social protection component states objectives and results for strengthening the coping capacities and self-reliance of vulnerable climate-affected communities.

The Shamil Technical Assistance Project could be used to assess the impact of climate shocks on household welfare, based on vulnerability maps, including the water vulnerability map. Again, the SASSP provides an example of this. In Niger, SASSP supported the preparation of a vulnerability map for the country that was used to assess the impact of climate shocks on household welfare, and on- and off-farm livelihood activities.

Build a green jobs component within a pilot on the skills-based economic inclusion of refugees. WFP is analysing the information gathered on working-age adult refugees to understand the realities of current and future labour demand and supply. This presents an opportunity to identify skills among refugees in support of the priorities and actions plans emerging from Jordan's NDC, NAP and National Green Growth Plan 2017. Ideally, the definition of green skills and jobs should be aligned with the National Green Growth Plan of 2017. The NDC could also serve as a useful guide in this respect.

5.4.2 Estimates of future levels of ICF

The ICF potential of the above options for the SSERJ and the relevant ICF KPIs are presented in Table 3. Estimates of what could actually count towards ICF would depend on the specific activities that are implemented, and the exact budget allocated to them. A high ICF allocation would require more targeted climate activities, which may be beyond the scope of the programme.

Table 4: Estimated potential for ICF tagging for SSERJ

ICF Level	Activity	ICF % level	Recommended KPI
Do minimum	Strengthen the climate narrative in the ToC and logframe	0	N/A
	Refine understanding of the climate vulnerability of SSERJ beneficiaries in support of future ICF tagging	0	N/A
	Provide evidence from FCDO programmes in support of climate SRSP	<1% of programme budget	ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
Climate good programming	Move away from stand-alone cash programming to cash for work schemes that build community- and household-level climate resilience	27%[a] of programme budget, assuming all cash transfers use these options	KPI 1: Number of people supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change as a result of ICF (Recommended) KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF
	Providing vocational training with cash transfers to support climate adaptation		
	Build a green jobs component in a pilot on the skills-based economic inclusion of refugees	<1% of programme budget	ICF TA KPI 2: Number of individuals and organisations informed by ICF TA
Climate stretch programming	Move away from stand-alone cash programming to cash for work schemes that build community- and household-level climate resilience, and provide vocational training with the cash transfers to support climate adaptation	Up to 35%[b] of the programme budget, with the exact level depending on the extent of activities and budget spend	KPI 1: Number of people supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change as a result of ICF (Recommended) KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF
	Pilot Climate Vulnerable Social Transfers Scheme		KPI 1: Number of people supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change as a result of ICF (Recommended) KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF
	Link shock responsive social protection system to disaster risk financing mechanisms		ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance KPI 15: Extent to which ICF intervention is likely to lead to transformational change

	Advocate for and influence social protection systems to offset the negative welfare impacts of Jordan's transition to a lower carbon and more climate resilient development pathway		KPI 15: Extent to which ICF intervention is likely to lead to transformational change
	Assess the impact of climate shocks on household welfare, based on vulnerability maps		ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance

[a] The business case makes provision for up to £26m to be allocated as unearmarked humanitarian cash assistance. This is 27% of the total SSERJ budget of £95m.

[b] SSERJ allocated £13m towards Estidama++ as against the $US54.5m indicated in the business case for financial assistance. It is assumed that 10% of the remaining financial budget of £41.5m, or £4.15m, could be used for the Pilot Climate Vulnerable Social Transfers Scheme. This would amount to 4.37% of the SSERJ budget of £95m.

Altogether, 27% of the total SSERJ budget of £95m would be ICF, on account of the move away from stand-alone cash programming. The remaining components would involve a relatively small TA budget. These have been assumed to be a maximum of 4% of the total programme budget.

6 ANALYSIS OF BRIDGE (BUILDING RESILIENCE, INCLUSION AND DIVERSITY THROUGH GIRLS' EDUCATION)

6.1 Programme overview

Specific objectives	• Mainstream inclusion in Jordan's education system by supporting access to education and improving the quality of education with a focus on marginalised children, particularly girls • Support learning recovery for 1.6 million host community and refugee children
Implementation period	March 2022 – December 2025
Budget	£30 million (now revised)
Implementing partner(s)	Financial aid is delivered via a multi-donor trust fund. UNICEF and Jordan's Ministry of Education
Share of ICF as per business case	Nil

BRIDGE derives its impetus from the UK's commitment to having every girl receive 12 years of quality education. BRIDGE outcomes contribute directly to the UK-led G7 goals of getting 40 million more girls in school by 2026. As such, the programme has been designed to build a more inclusive, effective, resilient, shock responsive public education system in Jordan. It aims to achieve this by improving access to and the quality of education for vulnerable children; improving the quality of teaching; and strengthening the public education system. The definition of vulnerable children in the programme covers girls, refugee children, and children with disabilities (CwDs).

In line with its objectives, BRIDGE is built around three components:

- *Component 1: Improving access to quality, inclusive education*. This component involves contributions towards the provision of tuition fees, textbooks and teaching and learning materials; stipends for transport and access to non-formal education (NFE) centres; and

financial aid and technical assistance that builds the capacity of Jordan's Ministry of Education (MoE) to design and deliver national education initiatives targeting marginalised children. The latter includes a learning recovery strategy to combat learning poverty and build resilience against future shocks across the public education sector.

- *Component 2: Improving teaching quality and providing curriculum support materials*. This component is designed to improve the pedagogical skills of teachers, with a focus on inclusive approaches and gender sensitive pedagogy; to provide learning resources to CwD; and to provide curriculum support materials to Learning Bridges. Learning Bridges is a national blended learning programme that assists students to recover and accelerate learning lost as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.
- *Component 3: World Bank Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) for Jordan Education Reform Support Payment for Results*. This component involves a no-cost extension to the GCFF that provides concessional financing to support GoJ to maintain education service delivery while maintaining overall debt sustainability. The objective of the extension is to enable the monitoring of results against ongoing UK investment.

The above objectives are intended to be delivered through financial aid to Jordan's Ministry of Education (MoE) through a multi-donor fund called the Accelerating Access Initiative (AAI) and a TA facility that provides flexible, responsive and adaptive TA for the MoE. The TA was intended to support the strengthening of the education system. It was also intended to devise an exit strategy for BRIDGE during the third year of programming.

Discussions with FCDO suggest that the AAI multi-donor programme has been subject to drastic budget cuts, driven by a combination of reasons that are well known to FCDO. The programme has no budget from April 2024 onwards. Subject to agreement of the business case addendum, the entire TA budget is expected to be reallocated to the financial aid component in order to maintain refugee access to education. Discussions with FCDO suggest that the programme aims to obtain a six-month extension. In the event that the extension is approved, the programme would conclude in June 2026.

Following the budget cuts, BRIDGE has prioritised three activities:

- Ensure the continuity of education for refugee children by covering teacher salaries.
- Ensure access to education for refugee children by covering their tuition fees, as non-Jordanians pay much higher school fees than Jordanian students.
- Ensure the inclusion of CwD in the education system through pedagogy programmes to support teachers, covering stipends for transport; ensure access to NFE centres; and provide relevant support devices and assistive technology.

6.2 ICF eligibility

Findings:

- The programme is currently not ICF eligible as per the C&E PrOF Guide.
- The business case provides entry points for climate smart programming and ICF badging.
- Current BRIDGE components are likely to be ICF eligible if changes in results tracking are made.

Does the programme contain explicit objectives and results on climate change? Are the objectives and results stated in the business case and/or logframe?

The business case for BRIDGE notes that BRIDGE intends to use policy reform interventions to promote climate smart thinking in the MoE. However, the programme objectives make no reference to climate change, and climate change is not mentioned in the ToC or logframe. The business case also notes that BRIDGE will not be eligible for ICF.

Does the business case consider how climate risks are changing now and in the future?

Since the business case notes that BRIDGE will not be eligible for ICF, it makes no reference to current or future climate risks.

How does the programme support adaptation to the effects of climate change and/or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions?

As noted above, the business case makes provision for interventions to promote climate smart thinking in the MoE but does not define these interventions. It refers to an economy-wide climate review due to be commissioned by the World Bank in 2022. It also notes the intention of the MoE to use the findings of this review to determine climate relevant support in the context of the future Education Sector Plan (ESP). A reading of the business case suggests that BRIDGE interventions towards climate smart thinking in the education sector would be guided by MoE priorities based on the World Bank climate review.

6.3 Review for current ICF spend

Findings:

- The business case and the 2023 Annual Review provide entry points for climate smart programming in the programme. Therefore, an ICF review was undertaken.
- The ICF review based on FCDO's position paper, 'Addressing the Climate, Environment, and Biodiversity Crises in and through Girls' Education' (2022) leads to the conclusion that the programme activities are not ICF eligible.
- Programme activities do not follow the approaches suggested under the position paper for making education activities eligible for climate finance, nor do they include measurable climate and environmental outcomes.
- A detailed review of programme activities also suggests that programme activities do not qualify for ICF. No evidence was found to suggest that the activities delivered climate-related benefits or co-benefits.
- The review concludes there is no ICF spend in BRIDGE as currently structured.
- Activities under BRIDGE could, however, be revised to become climate relevant. See options below.

As noted above, the business case notes that BRIDGE will not be eligible for ICF. The 2023 Annual Review recommends that the ToC be revised to focus more specifically on activities and interventions that target the most vulnerable children, including refugees, marginalised girls, out of school children, and children with disabilities. To some extent, this reinforces the intention not to address climate relevant objectives through BRIDGE. However, the business case for BRIDGE does open the opportunity to promote climate smart thinking in the MoE. The 2023 Annual Review reiterates the programme's intent to address climate change through education. The review notes the need to explore how climate considerations can be better integrated into the different components.

Discussions with FCDO also suggest that the reason for not looking at current and future climate risks in the context of education at the business case stage, and for noting that BRIDGE is not eligible for ICF, could be a lack of understanding and awareness of climate change and ICF amongst individuals involved with the preparation of the business case and the design of BRIDGE. Therefore, a review of the programme was undertaken to identify if the programme is in fact delivering intended or unintended climate benefits or climate co-benefits that could qualify for ICF.

The review was based on two considerations: On the policy side, it was based on FCDO's position paper, 'Addressing the Climate, Environment, and Biodiversity Crises in and through Girls' Education' (2022). On the implementation side, it focused on the activities of BRIDGE.

Review of BRIDGE in the FCDO position paper

FCDO's position paper emphasises that education in its entirety is essential for addressing climate and environmental change. It notes that addressing the learning crisis by providing quality education for all prepares children for the realities of a changing climate. A key theme is the role that girls' education plays as part of the solution to climate and environmental change. The paper includes a 'pathways of change' framework, which posits that resilient and inclusive education systems, together with knowledge, skills and agency for climate resilience and action, deliver increased access to and improved learning outcomes. These contribute to improved resilience and adaptation to, and mitigation of, climate and environmental change.

The paper provides guidance on education activities that are eligible for climate finance (Box 7). The guidance suggests that education activities focused on improving access to and quality of education for all would be eligible for climate finance only if these activities enhance the climate and environment outcomes set out in the 'pathways of change' framework. BRIDGE activities delivering improved access and quality of education do not include measurable climate and environmental outcomes. It can therefore be concluded that these activities are not ICF eligible.

Box 7: Guidance from the FCDO position paper of December 2022 on an approach for making education activities eligible for climate finance

FCDO's position paper of December 2022 advises a three-pronged approach in making education activities eligible for climate finance:

- Activities that build more resilient education systems in the face of climate hazards should be recorded as climate finance.
- Education activities focused on improving access to and quality of education for all must be prioritised, including in areas where there is no immediate opportunity to access additional climate finance. Modifications to existing activities could enhance the climate and environment outcomes set out in the 'pathways of change' framework, which could mean more education activities become eligible for climate finance in the short term.
- More research is needed to better understand the indirect effects of education upon climate and environment outcomes to support the expansion of climate finance education spend. It is also important to understand the counterfactual of an absence of quality education for all in the face of increasing climate hazards.

Review of BRIDGE activities

A review of the activities that have been delivered and are currently prioritised in BRIDGE indicates the following:

- The programme responds to the imperative of keeping vulnerable children, in particular refugee children and CwDs, in school and preventing them from dropping out of education. Climate resilience does not feature as an imperative. It is also not a targeted outcome for the programme.
- Climate shocks and stresses are not amongst the main barriers to education or the increasing rate of drop-out for children who are beneficiaries of the programme. Barriers lie in economic pressures, the poorer quality of education in public schools, limited opportunities for continuing higher education, violence in schools, the low availability of teachers and

infrastructure in public schools, and the difficulty of recruiting enough teachers in schools in refugee camps. For girls, the barriers also include early marriage, subsequent pregnancies, fears about security while traveling to and from school, and school-related gender-based violence (GBV).

- No evidence was found to establish if and how the children who are beneficiaries of the programme are climate vulnerable. Lack of evidence also makes it difficult to establish if climate change was an important push factor in their displacement or migration. Some interviewees cautioned against drawing causal links between low school attendance and the climate vulnerability of children who are beneficiaries of the programme. They also pointed out that refugee children tend to be more vulnerable because government policies and practices (even where favourable policies have been designed) discriminate against non-Jordanians.33 They noted that children in rural areas are more climate vulnerable, although this could be attributed to a lack of basic services and infrastructure as well as structural issues in Jordan's education sector, rather than climate change per se.
- A review of programme implementation indicates that no efforts were made in the first two years to identify or define interventions to promote climate smart thinking in the MoE. Given the reprioritisation of activities in the programme, climate smart interventions are not planned to be taken forward. Climate smart activities were also not incorporated in other components of the programme.

The review of activities leads to the conclusion that activities under BRIDGE do not currently qualify for ICF and that there is a need to generate evidence on which activities deliver climate-related benefits or co-benefits.

Options for current ICF spend

The review indicates that there is currently no ICF spend in BRIDGE.

33 For example, refugee children access education through 'double-shifted' public schools, where they largely attend the afternoon shift. The problems with this system are well understood within the Embassy.

6.4 Opportunities to enhance ICF relevance

Findings:

- There is potential for good and smart climate programming under BRIDGE. But options identified for climate stretch programming would enable only 10% or less of the programme budget to qualify as ICF spend.
- If future investments in WASH and school infrastructure are made, they could attract high levels of ICF. However, this approach may involve trade-offs with core programme activities and could divert programme budget towards capital investments.
- The exact level of ICF would depend on the specific activities that are implemented, and the exact budget allocated to them.

6.4.1 Programming options

Discussions with FCDO suggest that planning is underway for a business case addendum for BRIDGE that will include climate-related considerations. These are discussed below in the context of ICF relevance. There is further potential for good and smart climate programming, as shown below. The options will need to be evaluated for feasibility, design and the availability of further budget. It is also necessary to assess the cost-efficiency of including ICF KPIs, as reporting against these KPIs often requires extensive MRV or evidence. Assessing the feasibility of implementation and budgetary implications is beyond the scope of this report and would need to be undertaken separately.

Interviews conducted for this study highlighted the political economy of education for refugee children, as well as the political economy of development and humanitarian aid in Jordan. It is understood that programmes often require negotiation, agreement and even approval by GoJ. Donors often find it difficult to implement programming options unless these have been requested by the GoJ. The options presented below will need to be examined through a political economy lens, particularly where interventions involve trade-offs with the financial support currently being provided to GoJ for increasing access to education for refugee children.

Some options, while critical from the perspective of climate resilience, could over-burden an already weak education system. The trade-offs will need to be carefully assessed if these options are adopted.

Review ToC and logframe. The business case addendum is expected to include studies that improve research and understanding of the risks for youth from current and worsening climate change, and the role of climate change as a push factor for school drop-outs. The ToC and logframe should incorporate these activities. In addition, the business case addendum could be used as an opportunity to review programme activities with a view to including climate and environment outcomes. These should align with the FCDO position paper of December 2022 on approaches for making education activities eligible for climate finance. The inclusion of climate and environment outcomes in planned activities that aim to increase access to and quality of

education through schools in refugee camps could make these activities eligible for ICF. The ToC and logframe would also need to be reviewed to include these outcomes.

Study to understand the link between climate change and substance-use behaviour. The business case addendum is expected to include a study that elucidates the link between the rise in drug use amongst youth during dust storms. Climate change is contributing to the rising frequency of dust storms in Jordan. As such, the study will help to show if and how climate change is affecting the youth, and enable lessons to be drawn on future risks for the youth from current and worsening climate change. The study would be 100% ICF eligible. However, the proportion of budget going towards this activity is likely to be much smaller than other programme elements and will reflect a low ICF.

Study to understand the role of climate shocks and stresses in keeping refugee children out of school. The business case addendum is expected to include a study that provides insights into the profiles of out-of-school children, the reasons for drop-outs, and the barriers to schooling. The study is expected to analyse the role of climate change as a push factor for school drop-outs. As such, it will examine how current and worsening climate change could lead to the exclusion of refugee children from education. The study would be 100% ICF eligible. In line with the FCDO position paper of December 2022, the study could include a component that examines the counterfactual of an absence of quality education for refugee children in the face of increasing climate hazards. FCDO could use the findings of the study to stimulate and influence equitable education policies and programming for refugees in Jordan. However, the proportion of budget going towards this activity is likely to be much smaller than other programme elements and will reflect a low ICF.

Use climate vulnerability as a criterion for supporting children. Climate vulnerability could be added as a criterion for selecting children who benefit from support such as payment of tuition fees, stipends for transport and access to NFE centres. This could ensure that vulnerable children who live in areas that are at high risk from the impacts of climate shocks and stresses do not miss out on education. This will require defining climate vulnerability and designing metrics or parameters in support of the definition as well as crisis triggers. It may not be possible to implement this, as UK funding is delivered via a multi-donor trust fund. Ring fencing UK support using climate vulnerability as a criterion may be challenging from both a practical and a diplomatic perspective.

Support the integration of climate change into education curricula. BRIDGE could support GoJ on the integration of climate change into both formal and informal education programmes at primary and secondary level. This would be in line with Jordan's priorities under the NDC to the Paris Agreement and its National Adaptation Plan (see Box 7), as well as the pathways of change framework in the FCDO position paper. Depending on budget, this could range from light touch approaches such as facilitating access to existing state-of-the-art materials for climate change learning on specific topics, to the provision of technical assistance to the National Centre for Curriculum Development. The latter would support the development and tailoring of curricula according to age, school type, level and discipline (e.g. social studies, science, law, economics or ethics). Technical assistance could also include support for the development of assessment approaches or targets to determine the success of climate

education in supporting more resilient, adaptive and mitigative behaviours. GoJ is commencing the development of a new education plan.
This provides an entry point for advocating and influencing national curriculum reform.

Box 8: Focus on education in Jordan's climate policies

Jordan's climate change policy for 2022–2050 notes that the lack of a coherent gender-differentiated and child sensitive CC policy framework constrains the climate resilient, low-carbon development of Jordan and its contributions to the global effort to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC. The policy notes the government's intention and efforts to enhance the human capacity of ministries and governorates with specialised focal person(s) dealing with women, children and youth. Also, its intention to propose best practices for institutional coordination in other institutions such as academia and private sector.

Jordan's NDC and NAP provide the basis for integrating climate change impacts and adaptation into education curricula. The NDC notes that understanding the causes, impacts and solutions for climate change is now a priority area for education, in order to prepare students to play active roles in addressing climate change impacts. The NAP notes that this will ensure that climate change is incorporated into education from an early age, so that communities are equipped to adapt to its effects. The NDC and NAP propose the following actions:

- Raising awareness and engagement through formal and informal education on climate change, environment and sustainable development in the community and among children and young people;
- Developing an enhanced, unified, common entry level education curriculum that includes new themes on climate change and environment;
- Raising climate and environmental awareness using materials that are contextualised for Jordan, to be disseminated through a) social media b) informal settlements, c) schools d) youth centres and youth innovation incubators.

The NAP also makes recommendations for the research and education sectors in Jordan to support the implementation of NAP:

- Start systematically integrating climate change aspects into the curriculum, tailoring information on the national adaptation policies to the needs of different grade levels. Also incorporate the provisions of these policies into other components of the academic framework.
- Re-evaluate curricula aiming at better educating and raising the awareness of students on climate change issues, particularly in departments that teach environmental sciences and management.
- Mainstream comprehensive and progressive climate change science into all curricula, from elementary schools to secondary schools and universities, and keep this information updated.

The activity would be eligible for ICF as it would support low-carbon development or adaptation. However, it is unlikely to give a major boost to the ICF share of BRIDGE, given that the share of budget going towards this component would be small. The ICF share of this component would also depend on the precise nature of activities. For example, dedicated technical assistance would be 100% ICF, but advocacy and influencing activities by the PRO/SRO would probably

have a lower ICF share, as the proportion of time devoted to this advocacy/influencing would be small in relation to overall time spent on the programme.

Increase the availability of materials to support climate change awareness and response. The ICF relevance of BRIDGE could also be enhanced by facilitating the design and distribution of education materials that support climate change awareness and response, as well as a clear dissemination strategy for these. Once again, this would be in line with Jordan's priorities under the NDC to the Paris Agreement and its National Adaptation Plan (see Box 7). The activity would be eligible for ICF as it would support low-carbon development or adaptation, but it is unlikely to give a major boost to the ICF share of BRIDGE, given that the share of budget going towards this component would be small compared to other elements.

Training and teaching materials for teachers and educators. FCDO's position paper of December 2022 notes that teachers play an essential role in raising awareness and delivering information on the climate crisis. BRIDGE could strengthen teachers' capacities to deliver accurate information, integrate local content, promote critical thinking about climate change, and encourage action on mitigation and adaptation. This would be in line with the objective of enhancing teaching quality and providing curriculum support materials by improving the pedagogical skills of teachers. However, as with the production of materials to support climate change awareness and response, the proportion of budget going towards this activity is likely to be much smaller than other programme elements, and will reflect a low ICF.

Adopt the Comprehensive School Safety Framework (CSSF). BRIDGE could adopt the pillars of the CSSF explained in the FCDO position paper of December 2022 (see Box 8). The CSSF covers a range of actions that could be refined and tailored to Jordan's context. Tailored actions that address the needs of vulnerable children could also stem the flow of school drop-outs and encourage more vulnerable children to join the formal education system. As with support for the integration of climate change into education curricula, a range of options is available here. These include:

- Advocacy with GoJ for schools to be designed to climate sensitive and disaster resilient standards;
- Mandating partners like UNICEF to ensure that schools in camps are designed to climate sensitive and disaster resilient standards (see Box 9);

- Supporting GoJ for a resilient, climate shock responsive public education system. This could include mainstreaming and integrating disaster risk assessment and mapping in the new education plan, thereby linking the education plan and the national disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategy to contingencies for continuity of education. This option would include giving advice on approaches to delivering out-of-school education, in order to ensure that teaching continues even during severe or high impact climate events;
- Advising on or supporting the mainstreaming of child-centred risk reduction activities in curricula and providing guidelines for schools' disaster readiness.

Box 9: The Comprehensive School Safety Framework as explained in the FCDO position paper of December 2022

FCDO's position paper of December 2022 covers CSSF as a critical component of resilient and inclusive education systems. Key features of CSSF as explained in the paper are as follows:

- Safer learning facilities: Where schools are built, from what materials, and the construction methods used are all critical to determining whether schools are resilient to hazards and inclusive, or represent a risk to safety.
- Education continuity management: The education sector must be part of national and sub-national approaches to DRR to protect schools in times of disaster and to ensure contingencies for continuity of education.
- Risk reduction and resilience education: In countries at risk of extreme weather events, incorporating DRR and resilience education into curricula has practical and life-saving benefits. Violence prevention and psychosocial support form part of this pillar.

According to the position paper, possible actions under the CSSF could include:

- Geo-spatial mapping to identify areas and schools at risk of flooding or landslide, and hazard-specific school design and construction based on codes and standards;
- Maintenance and retrofitting of existing schools;
- Innovations such as floating schools;
- Contingency plans and inclusive remote learning approaches;
- Management plans for education in disaster;
- Parental engagement and mobilisation of the community;
- Incorporating risk reduction and resilience into curricula and teacher training.

Support climate smart construction and WASH facilities. There are other opportunities such as climate-proofing education infrastructure. This opportunity most directly aligns with climate finance, as it links climate with education. It would involve ensuring that school buildings, including WASH facilities, are designed and built to withstand exposure to climate hazards in order to reduce the likelihood of damage or loss, which otherwise affects their capacity to be used to provide education. Ensuring that infrastructure is resilient in the face of climate risk is a clear adaptation measure. This has inclusion co-benefits as girls and children with disabilities are more likely to drop out of school if WASH facilities are unavailable or inaccessible. There is also potential for education facilities and infrastructure to support low-carbon development and provide mitigation benefits. In addition to ensuring that buildings themselves are resilient to climate hazard exposure, low-carbon buildings follow certain principles to minimise emissions in

both their construction and use. This approach has been used within FCDO's Zambia EDGE programme (see Box 9). However, this option could divert much of the programme budget towards capital investments and may therefore best be done under a dedicated programme with adequate budget.

Box 10: FCDO's Zambia Empowerment and Development for Girls Education (EDGE) Programme

EDGE aims to expand access to quality secondary education and improve education outcomes for 36,100 girls in Zambia by increasing the number of secondary schools and improving teaching quality in rural areas, as well as through a 'development diplomacy' approach to support policy reform. The EDGE business case recognises the challenges posed by climate change to achieving improved educational outcomes and includes activities focused on curriculum design and delivery, as well as sustainable school design. Specifically, it makes provision for addressing communities' vulnerability to climate change through the school curriculum and incorporating climate sensitive and resilient school construction practices. This includes conducting strategic environmental assessments in order to explore ways to increase the climate resilience of schools and grounds; for example, by introducing cooling, drainage and soil stabilisation features. Such measures help to ensure year-round access, avoid interruptions in learning, and contribute to a comfortable learning environment. The business case includes a climate assurance analysis to identify risks from climate change for education outcomes and proposes measures to mitigate and overcome them.

EDGE has actively promoted low-cost and climate resilient school construction practices, including innovations in water management, cooling and renewable energy in schools that fall within the programme purview. Programme reviews note that the programme partner Promoting Equality in African Schools (PEAS)34 has successfully piloted approaches to reduce the environmental impact of building and running schools, while using established practices for school design and construction methods, and reducing costs. The reviews also note that the programme has influenced communities to work on climate change through the construction of climate sensitive designs.

From September 2022 to September 2023, EDGE reported 18% of the budget for the reporting period as ICF. This included both CDEL (capital expenditure) and RDEL (grant finance) budgets, with the CDEL budget accounting for the majority of the ICF spend.

6.4.2 Estimates of future levels of ICF

With the above options and relevant ICF KPIs, there is potential for ICF allocations, as shown in Table 4. Estimates of what could actually count towards ICF would depend on the specific activities that are implemented and the exact budget allocated towards them. A high ICF allocation would require more targeted climate activities, which may be beyond the scope of the programme.

Table 5: Estimated potential for ICF tagging for BRIDGE

ICF Level	Activity	ICF % level	Recommended KPI
Do minimum	Include climate and environment outcomes in	0	NA

34 PEAS is a not-for-profit organisation focusing on expanding educational opportunities to those that need them the most – including rural communities, low-income families and girls.

	business case addendum. Review ToC and logframe to include outcomes.		
Climate good programming	Study to understand the link between climate change and substance-use behaviour.	1–2% or less of programme budgeta	ICF TA KPI 3: Number of climate policies informed by ICF TAb ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
	Study to understand the role of climate shocks and stresses in keeping refugee children out of school.		
Climate stretch programming	Support the integration of climate change into education curricula.	10%d of the programme budget, with the exact level depending on the extent of activities and budget spend 50–100% depending on investments made	ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
	Increase the availability of materials to support climate change awareness and response.		ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
	Provide training and teaching materials for teachers and educators.		ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
	Adopt the Comprehensive School Safety Framework (CSSF).		ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
	Support climate smart construction and WASH facilities.		ICF KPI 4: Number of people with increased climate resilience

[a]Studies are likely to involve small budgets.

[b]ICF KPI 3 covers specialist research that addresses specific, practical questions and provides recommendations, as well as academic research that has policy relevance.

[c]Financial aid is delivered via a multi-donor fund. Donors contributing to this fund work with different financial years. Discussions with FCDO indicate that donor contributions fluctuate, with budget reductions made at short notice. As such, it is difficult to ascribe attribution to UK support.

[d]These are likely to involve smaller budgets. In addition, the proportion of the curriculum that is climate relevant in relation to the wider curriculum is likely to be low in ICF percentage terms. The proportion of skills and time spent on climate change in relation to other elements is also likely to be low, which will be reflected in ICF percentage terms (unless a dedicated climate programme is delivered).

7 ANALYSIS OF THE JPP (JORDAN PROTECTION PROGRAMME)

7.1 Programme overview

Specific objectives	• Deliver protection, prevention and response services to vulnerable people in Jordan, including refugees children with disabilities and survivors of gender-based violence (GBV) • Strengthen national response and rehabilitation services to increase the capacity and quality of essential protection services for refugees and Jordanians at the risk of violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation
Implementation period	November 2021 – March 2025
Budget	£15 million
Implementing partner(s)	Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Jordan River Foundation (JRF), Humanity and Inclusion UK (HI)
Share of ICF as per business case	Nil

JPP aims to strengthen the protection environment for refugees and host communities in Jordan who are at risk of violence, coercion and deprivation. In addition, it endeavours to strengthen national protection services, promoting the inclusion of vulnerable refugees in national systems. Services provided under the programme include case management for children at risk of exploitation and child labour, services for survivors of gender- based violence or those suffering from trauma, and support to people with disabilities.

The intended outcome of the programme is to increase the capacity and quality of essential protection systems, thereby improving the wellbeing of vulnerable people.

JPP is built around four components:

- *Component 1: The provision of life-saving protection response and rehabilitation services for women, men, girls, and boys at risk of GBV, child protection and other protection concerns*. This component is based on interventions that support target beneficiaries through case management and referrals, structured psychosocial support sessions, cash for protection grants, rehabilitation services (for people with disabilities), and enrolment into early intervention programmes for CwD.

- *Component 2: Prevention programming for mitigating the risks of GBV*. This component engages men through an accountable practice programme and structured GBV prevention programmes, including community-based empowerment and awareness training.
- *Component 3: Prevention programming and specialised services for mitigating child protection*. This component focuses on prevention activities, and involves working with various groups in communities to mitigate child protection risks, child labour, early marriage, and the removal of children from school. It also involves establishing support groups for caregivers of CwD and targeting children for the early detection of disabilities.
- *Component 4: Capacity building and strengthening of national and local structures providing protection, rehabilitation and early development services*. This component delivers support and capacity building for government and national actors, with the aim of delivering sustainable services that can continue beyond the lifetime of JPP. Activities include training for staff of community-based organisations and national NGOs on child safeguarding, safe identification and referral.

The budget for FY 2023–2024 was nearly halved as a result of factors that are well known to FCDO. Several activities were either curtailed or stopped. Although the aim is to restore these activities should the budget become available, in the current final year JPP aims to prioritise Component 4. The intention is to enable national and local structures, including government systems, to sustain the provision of response and rehabilitation services to vulnerable populations after JPP concludes.

7.2 ICF eligibility

Findings:

- The programme is not currently ICF eligible as per the C&E PrOF Guide, as the business case and programming does not explicitly target climate objectives.
- JPP spend has potential to become ICF eligible through the development of an ICF justification note that sets out the rationale for ICF and agrees on ICF KPIs and reporting modalities.

Does the programme contain explicit objectives and results on climate change? Are the objectives and results stated in the business case and/or log frame?

The business case for JPP notes that JPP does not have any specific climate benefits as it is not responding to climate challenges. As a result, the programme objectives do not make reference to climate change, nor is it mentioned in the ToC or logframe.

Does the business case consider how climate risks are changing now and in the future?

The business case makes no reference to current and future climate-related impacts on the vulnerable groups being supported by JPP.

How does the programme support adaptation to the effects of climate change and/or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions?

The business case notes that although JPP does not respond to climate challenges, there are opportunities to explore ways in which its programmes respond to people exposed to climate vulnerabilities. This could be through its support to national programmes, ensuring that any work conducted at the national level considers refugees. However, the business case does not outline any opportunities to this end.

7.3 Review for current ICF spend

Findings:

- Although the use of the C&E PrOF Guide suggests that the programme is currently not ICF eligible, an ICF review was undertaken to identify if the programme is delivering unintended climate benefits or climate co-benefits.
- There is limited evidence on the additional impact of climate extremes and shocks on the vulnerable groups being supported by JPP.
- Opportunities to increase the climate results reported by the programme exist and could increase the ICF eligibility of the programme.
- Given the limited time available in the current programme, work should be undertaken to develop the evidence base for future programming in this area.

As noted above, reference to the C&E PrOF Guide suggests that the programme is currently not ICF eligible, unless additional reporting and an ICF justification note is developed. Nevertheless, a review of the programme was undertaken to identify if the programme is delivering unintended climate benefits or climate co-benefits that could qualify for ICF. The review focused on the programme activities as well as the beneficiaries of the JPP.

A review of the activities that have been delivered and are currently prioritised indicates that the JPP is not engaged in activities that respond specifically to climate challenges or have climate relevant co-benefits. Climate vulnerability is not currently a criterion in the selection of beneficiaries. For example, neither the needs-based assessments used for identifying beneficiaries for case management and referrals nor the vulnerability assessments used for the delivery of early intervention (EI) services considers climate vulnerability as a criterion. There is a reasonable expectation that programme beneficiaries are more climate vulnerable than the general refugee population, but no evidence was found to establish the climate vulnerability of programme beneficiaries or the share of programme beneficiaries who may be climate vulnerable. This make an estimation of climate benefits difficult.

However, some interviewees noted that several beneficiaries of JPP are likely to be climate vulnerable. Two examples were used to illustrate this:

- First, interviewees noted that refugees are disproportionately affected by the lack of basic services such as access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services and electricity in Jordan. Where water supply is available to households, the lack of income or the low income levels of refugees makes the service unaffordable. This makes refugees more vulnerable to climate shocks, limiting their ability to cope with them. Many refugees have to walk long distances to public water supply points and rely on public latrines. Both these challenges leave them vulnerable to harassment, in particular at access points. Many families have resorted to open defecation around camps or build in-house latrines that pose health and safety risks. The risk is heightened in the case of a climate shock.
- Second, interviewees noted that almost all CwDs benefitting from EI services were climate vulnerable. Climate variability and climate shocks affect them in a variety of ways and leave them vulnerable. For example, a change in walking surface increases the risks for people who are visually impaired as well as for people who use mobility aids. The assistive technology used by many CwDs is vulnerable to high temperatures. Economic hardships and difficult living conditions characterised by lack of air-conditioned homes means that assistive devices do not function or frequently malfunction.[35] Finally, climate shocks and stresses have disproportionate effects on CwDs by curtailing their ability to access services such as health and education.

Representatives of the Jordan River Foundation (JRF) who were interviewed for this study noted that the number and severity of protection cases in Jordan rises as climate events rise, particularly during heatwaves. Referring to 'heat-related aggression', the interviewees noted that heatwaves tend to lead to a rise in violence against women and children as well as early marriage of girls. JRF has gathered data on this. Although the data is not synthesised into a rigorous evidence base, the organisation is using the gathered narratives to inform its strategy and intervention planning.

While it may be possible to argue that many beneficiaries of the programme would be vulnerable to climate shocks, a nuanced approach is needed to understand whether this allows for ICF relevance and tagging.

- It is not possible to segregate and identify JPP beneficiaries who are climate vulnerable. No evidence was found from delivery partners' reporting to establish this. Therefore, the evidence base for ICF relevance is weak.
- In the absence of data from Jordan River Foundation, there is no hard evidence to suggest that the changing climate or climate events create additional risks in the context of GBV and child protection. There is also no evidence to establish the extent to which JPP is explicitly providing protection, prevention and rehabilitation services in response to exacerbated GBV and child protection risks that occur as a result of climate change.

35 Assistive devices that withstand high temperatures attract high custom duties in Jordan and are beyond the reach of the vulnerable groups who benefit from programmes such as the JPP.

- Attributing protection and prevention services to the climate vulnerability of beneficiaries does not automatically help individuals adapt to or build climate resilience, as defined by UK ICF indicators, i.e., building adaptive, anticipatory or absorptive capacity (see Box 1).
- ICF KPIs are not designed to capture the climate vulnerability of beneficiaries. Rather they are designed to capture how programmes support beneficiaries to adapt to or become resilient to climate change. Therefore, the impact of support on climate resilience needs to be tested.
- While beneficiaries are likely to be climate vulnerable, caution needs to be exercised in linking the provision of protection and prevention services with the absence of basic services or heatwaves that make beneficiaries climate vulnerable. Drawing these causal relationships risks obscuring the pressing structural factors that make protection and prevention services necessary, such as gender inequality, socially ascribed power imbalances, and discriminatory gender norms. The ICF relevance is therefore questionable.

The above review leads to the conclusion that the activities under JPP do not currently qualify for ICF. ICF badging could be possible if work were undertaken to understand the linkages and identify the ICF KPIs to report against.

Options for current ICF spend

The review indicates that there is little directly attributable ICF spend within JPP. A case could be made that the programme is delivering wider indirect climate benefits, but this currently lacks supporting evidence. Therefore, the options for current ICF spend would be as follows (see Table 5):

- High case: This option would involve high reputation risk for FCDO in the absence of supporting evidence.
- Medium case: The medium case option could be used and the lower attribution of 15% considered. This option would need to be reviewed and agreed within FCDO, since ICF KPIs are not designed to capture the climate vulnerability of beneficiaries.
- Low case: ICF relevance could be considered if more explicit reference to climate were included in programme documents, and if evidence were collected that programme support results in reduced vulnerability.

7.4 Opportunities to enhance ICF relevance

Findings:

- Options have been identified for integrating climate resilience within various programme components before the programme concludes in March 2025.
- Although these options are unlikely to deliver strong ICF contributions, they could be valuable in the context of future programming.
- In particular, the programme could prioritise support to synthesise and analyse data on the climate risks faced by vulnerable groups in refugee contexts, especially the impact of heatwaves on the risks of GBV and violence against children.

7.4.1 Programming options

JPP concludes in March 2025. The limited time left before conclusion has implications for delivering meaningful climate relevant activities that enable ICF eligibility and reporting. The nature of the programme also means that options for integrating[36] climate resilience into programme components remain limited. Nevertheless, there is scope for improving the evidence base and building the capacity of national and local systems to understand how climate events create additional risks in the context of GBV and child protection, and the risks posed by climate events for those with disabilities.

Build the evidence base on the role of heatwaves in precipitating GBV and violence against children. JPP could commission a study through the JRF to build evidence on the effects and impact of heatwaves on GBV and violence against children. The study could support the JRF to synthesise and analyse the data it has gathered into a systematic review (quantitative or qualitative). These findings would facilitate a better understanding of the effects of heatwaves on GBV and violence against children. It would also contribute to an understanding of how increasing intensity and frequency of climate events could exacerbate the prevalence of such behaviours. The findings could have important implications for gender-transformative interventions, policies and implementation in Jordan.

Such a study could also provide evidence on how JPP is explicitly providing protection, prevention and rehabilitation services in response to GBV and violence against children precipitated by heatwaves. This would be in line with the findings of the 2023 Annual Review of the JPP, which observes the need to (i) improve the evidence base across the interventions in terms of beneficiary outcome and impact, and to support better assessment of value for money, and (ii) develop better insights into the profile of programme participants to understand the extent to which current activities meet the needs of the different targeted beneficiary groups.

Build the capacity of national and local actors. As noted earlier, JPP intends to prioritise capacity building and the strengthening of national and local entities to enable them to provide protection and rehabilitation services to refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. JPP could use this as an entry point to sensitise actors within national and local structures on the risks posed by extreme weather events for those with disabilities, and how increasing heat stress and extreme weather events could lead to heightened violence against women, children and members of the LGBTQI+ community. This could also involve building the capacity of national and local entities to identify vulnerable individuals within communities most affected by extreme weather events and climate stresses for the provision of prevention, protection and rehabilitation services.

7.4.2 Estimates of future levels of ICF

JPP's ICF potential with the above options and relevant ICF KPIs are presented in Table 5. Estimates of what could actually count towards ICF would depend on the specific activities that are implemented, and the exact budget allocated towards them. However, the studies and capacity building would involve small budgets, meaning that the proportion of climate-related

36 Integration is not the same thing as climate mainstreaming, which more broadly makes climate risks and attention to climate resilience central to all activities.

spend would be minimal in relation to the total programme budget. As such, these options are unlikely to deliver strong contributions to ICF.

Table 6: Estimated potential for ICF tagging for JPP

ICF Level	Activity	ICF % level	Recommended KPI
Attribution of current activities	Recognition of climate resilience/vulnerability reduction outcomes of current activities	Medium casea (Possible if approach is agreed as an interim policy, given lack of FCDO policy guidelines) Low case (preferable)	KPI 1: People supported to better adapt to the effects of climate change KPI 4: Number of people whose resilience has been improved as a result of ICF
Climate good programming	Study on the role of heatwaves in precipitating GBV and violence against children	< 1% of programme budget	ICF TA KPI 3: Number of climate policies informed by ICF TAb ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
	Build the capacity of national and local actors on the risks posed by extreme weather events for CwDs, the risks from increasing heat stress for violence against women, children, and sexual and gender minorities	< 1% of programme budgeta	ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance
	Build the capacity of national and local entities to identify vulnerable individuals within communities most affected by extreme weather events and climate stresses for the provision of prevention, protection and rehabilitation services	< 1% of programme budgeta	ICF TA KPI 1: Number of countries supported by ICF technical assistance

[a]This figure is an estimate of the climate resilience impact of current untargeted support. Studies and capacity building are likely to involve small budgets.
[b]ICF KPI 3 covers specialist research that addresses specific, practical questions and provides recommendations, as well as academic research that has policy relevance.

7.5 Future programming options

FCDO is preparing a business case for a programme to succeed JPP. The programme will continue to focus on GBV prevention and protection, and enhance its focus on people with disabilities. It will also have a strong localisation agenda in the form of strengthening the institutional and organisational capacity of local organisations, in particular NGOs, to deliver prevention and protection services and enhance the sustainability of these services beyond donor support.

With the business case preparation having commenced, there is opportunity to integrate climate considerations and climate resilience activities into the new programme and build ICF relevance from an early stage. Options to this end are presented below. The options will need to be evaluated for the availability of further budget, feasibility and design. It is also necessary to plan for the ICF-related monitoring and reporting of these options, as reporting against ICF KPIs often requires extensive MRV or evidence. Assessing the feasibility of implementation and the budgetary implications is beyond the scope of this report and would need to be undertaken separately.

Build the capacity of NGOs for climate action. A co-benefit of institutional and organisational capacity building for NGOs would be that the NGOs build the capacity to absorb funding and deliver programmes that go beyond protection services. Specifically, NGOs would build their levels of operational capacity, financial accountability, internal controls, and monitoring evaluation and learning (MEL) capacity, which is required by international donors, including those supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation interventions in Jordan. This would provide an entry point for NGOs to access climate finance in order to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation projects.

JPP could therefore include capacity building support that strengthens the technical competencies of NGOs with regard to climate change and climate finance. At the minimum, this could include tailored learning on the technical capacities needed to participate in climate policy making processes, entry points within the national policy and planning cycles, and knowledge of climate finance. To link with the core focus of JPP, the support could target the intersection of climate change and gender as well as people with disabilities (PwDs). This could include, for example, capacity on the Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion (GEDSI) dimensions of climate change, disaster risk reduction and resilience building; gender and disabilitity differentiated vulnerabilities in the context of climate change and disaster risk reduction; GEDSI-responsive climate action; and tools for GEDSI mainstreaming.

This would support the increased uptake of appropriate GEDSI-responsive climate change adaptation and mitigation solutions among civil society organisations (CSOs) and their partners. In the medium to long term, it would also facilitate bottom-up approaches to reduce vulnerability and build the climate resilience of at-risk individuals who are the focus of JPP's support. It could also help improve the effectiveness of climate finance in a number of ways: (i) by catalysing a greater role for NGOs in the implementation of climate change programmes in Jordan; (ii) by allowing donors to use national systems to deliver climate finance; (iii) by enabling them to play a larger role in mainstreaming GEDSI into future climate policies and programmes, and (iv) by enabling NGOs to participate in national climate change policy processes. The latter would empower NGOs to perform 'watchdog' functions and provide counter-checks to improve the accountability of policy implementation. It would also make it possible for them to access or demand information, then translate it to popular form for increased transparency.

Build the capacity of NGOs to identify individuals at risk of violence associated with climate vulnerability. The evidence base on the role of heatwaves in precipitating GBV and violence against children could be used to train NGOs to identify women and children at risk of violence or in need of protection from early marriage or exploitation in the event of heatwaves

and other climate stresses. This would allow JPP's successor programme to mitigate potential risks for these individuals while also building the capacity of national systems to increase the availability, accessibility and quality of prevention and protection services for these individuals.

Build the awareness and capacity of policy makers. Some interviewees pointed out that policy makers and government officials in Jordan have an acute lack of understanding of climate change. They do not see the issue as a priority, in part owing to a lack of understanding of the key concepts, challenges and potential consequences (the social, economic and humanitarian costs). They noted that women, girls and PwDs are often overlooked in responding to climate-related health impacts and disaster planning. Building the awareness and capacity of policy makers on climate change is therefore crucial for putting climate change on policy makers' lists of priorities.

Within the scope of JPP's successor programme, awareness and capacity building initiatives could focus on the disproportionate impact of climate change on PwDs and women and girls. Capacity building could target the integration of GEDSI perspectives into climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction programmes; the expansion of GEDSI-responsive finance; enhancing gender statistics and data; fostering a just and GEDSI-responsive transition; and a disability justice approach to disaster planning and low-carbon transition. Such capacity building support would also help Jordan deliver on its NDC to the Paris Agreement.

The NDC notes that Jordan is pursuing gender mainstreaming in climate change action by developing the National Gender Mainstreaming in Climate Change Policy. The policy is driven by the recognition that climate change impacts women, men, girls and boys differently and that there is a need for adopting gender-responsive solutions to improve the gender resilience to climate change. The status of the policy was not found in the public domain.[37]

37 GoJ commenced a Gender Equality and Climate Change in Jordan Analysis with UNDP in March 2022. See https://jordan.un.org/en/176685-undp-ministry-environment-launch-gender-equality-and-climate-change-jordan-analysis

8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMES

8.1 Recommendations for future HIP programming

Recommendations for programming under future HIP business cases have been presented above. In addition to these recommendations, future HIP programmes could consider the options provided below. It is important to build ICF understanding and awareness across HIP teams to enable them to examine climate relevance, consider programming options, and draw links to ICF during programme conceptualisation, design and business case preparation.

A non-exhaustive list of opportunities for mobilising finance in support of initiatives that build the climate resilience of refugees in Jordan is provided in Annex 2: .

General recommendations for future HIP programming include the following:
Use climate vulnerability-based targeting criteria. Where possible, HIP programmes could integrate GEDSI-responsive climate risks and climate marginalisation into the selection criteria for the provision of services and support.

Build Jordan-specific evidence on the impacts of climate change. Where possible, HIP programming could include support for building a Jordan-specific evidence base. Some interviewees noted the lack of Jordan-specific evidence and understanding of how climate shocks and stresses affect different population groups in practice. They noted that much of the evidence currently being used in Jordan comes from other contexts. They were concerned that an early warning system for climate shocks and a climate SRSP risks being designed for events that are not relevant to Jordan. Improving Jordan-specific evidence is therefore crucial for better policy making and translating policies into programmes and services.

Building the evidence base and encouraging implementing partners to gather data and anecdotal experiences within the scope of each programme could improve policy making, planning and implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation programmes. Where possible, complementary support could be accessed from PHENOMENAL for building the evidence base as well as for interventions to support evidence-based policy making.

Greening operations of delivery partners. Where possible, HIP programmes could encourage, support and even mandate delivery partners to green their operations. This could include, for example, requirements for delivery partners to adopt lower-carbon alternatives, reduce waste, avoid plastic, adopt water conservation techniques, use sustainable materials, and adopt solar energy for office operations. FCDO could also ensure that delivery partners are complying with best practice guidelines to reduce climate risks and impacts on water security.

Support durable solutions programming to reduce the climate vulnerability of refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. Given increased vulnerabilities among the refugee population in

Jordan and acknowledging that the refugees will probably stay in the country for the coming years, future programmes could include the following components: tackling systemic issues around quality of service provision; addressing legal and policy issues that constrain livelihoods or access to services for refugees and PwDs; and improving linkages between food security and nutrition, WASH, health and education responses (along with protection referrals), while enhancing geographical co-location. This will help build the resilience of the most vulnerable populations to prepare, withstand, adapt to and recover from climate-related shocks and stresses (as well as conflict and disease related shocks).

8.2 Recommendations on how existing and possible future programmes can support Jordan's CRNI

Develop local climate action plans. As noted earlier, significant numbers of refugees live within host communities. The dual challenge of service provision to meet both the growing demand and climate change means that local authorities will be placed under pressure and that local/municipal development plans will need to respond to these challenges. Against this backdrop, future programmes under CRNI could support the strengthening of the decentralisation agenda and the empowerment of local/municipal authorities to develop local climate action plans to respond to these challenges. There is precedence for such action in Joprdan in the form of the Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans developed by the Irbid and Karak municipalities.

Support climate sensitive water resource management. Future programmes could focus on water resource management. Water insecurity is likely to affect refugees and vulnerable Jordanians alike, and is also likely to constraint humanitarian assistance. Some interviewees noted that water shortages would impact water affordability for both beneficiaries and humanitarian service providers, affecting the sustainability of humanitarian services. Water insecurity would also constraint the ability of humanitarian actors to create livelihood opportunities for refugees, in particular. They also noted that despite Jordan's long history of coping with water stress and water-related conflicts, water is not on the agenda of public or policy discourse.

However, climate change resilience is embedded within the National Water Strategy 2023–2040.[38] This provides an entry point for CRNI programmes. Future programmes could highlight vulnerabilities from water insecurity within their sectoral or thematic scope and advocate for integrated water resource management; systematic reforms for greater efficiencies in Jordan's water distribution system; the effective treatment of wastewater for discharge and reuse; and efficient water use practices to reduce the increase in water stress and mitigate its most negative effects.

38 See https://www.mwi.gov.jo/EBV4.0/Root_Storage/AR/EB_Ticker/National_Water_Strategy_2023-2040_Summary-English_-ver2.pdf

Supply-side interventions such as desalination, the rehabilitation of water networks, wastewater treatment, clean technologies for water treatment systems, and rainwater harvesting could be supported through climate finance if the rationale in the context of climate change is well established and if supply-side interventions are supplemented with wider sector reforms and demand-side management measures. These efforts ought to be coupled with the integration of renewable energy technologies into water services. This would not only improve energy efficiency and secure sustainable energy supplies, but foster environmental sustainability, thereby reducing dependencies on non-renewable resources and alleviating potential conflicts related to energy scarcity.

Programmes could also promote a water–energy–food nexus approach to addressing synergies and trade-offs, which would yield longer-term overall socio-economic benefits. Where possible, complementary support could be accessed from PHENOMENAL for building the evidence base as well as for interventions to support evidence-based policy making.

WASH initiatives and public health. The longer-term indirect effects of water stress relate to health, nutrition, education and human capital, with consequences for labour productivity, poverty, and the empowerment of women and girls. Investments in WASH facilities are therefore a cornerstone of addressing the health and educational risks exacerbated by climate change in underserved regions. CRNI programmes could support WASH initiatives that reduce the climate vulnerability of refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. Resource management enhancements could focus on collaborative projects; for instance, a community-led, water reuse programme in urban refugee settlements. This approach would reduce the pressure on local water supplies, thereby decreasing social tensions with host communities and the risks posed by water scarcity. This would align with CRNI's goals.

Educational enhancement, capacity building, and emergency preparedness. The absence of climate focused education within existing curricula restricts community capabilities to adapt to and mitigate the repercussions of climate change. It also restricts their buy-in to climate action that could be integrated into various initiatives. Hence, it is essential to integrate climate change and sustainability into educational programmes, in both academic and technical settings. Through the provision of the necessary knowledge and skills, community resilience and social cohesion could be greatly enhanced. Capacity building efforts should extend beyond youth and vulnerable communities, and include the training of staff for emergency preparedness. This is crucial for responding to natural disasters and managing conflicts arising from resource scarcity.

8.3 Recommendations for FCDO internal policy making

The ICF analysis and ICF badging of FCDO's HIP portfolio in Jordan is indicative of the challenges associated with the ICF badging of humanitarian programmes that build the resilience of refugees in low- and middle-income countries. Many of these countries are not considered climate vulnerable, judging from the indices frequently used in discussions on climate finance.

In the absence of ICF guidance for humanitarian programmes and specifically for programmes directed towards refugees, the analysis makes assumptions that cannot be tested, proven or unproven, given data limitations. It is recommended that FCDO consider devising/revising internal policies for:

- ICF guidelines and indicators for humanitarian programmes, wherein guidelines consider the differing contexts of fragile, conflict affected and refugee hosting settings;
- ICF badging for programmes that indirectly build the climate resilience of internally displaced persons and refugees;
- ICF badging for programmes in fragile, conflict affected and refugee hosting settings where sufficient evidence may not be available to establish ICF spend;
- Types of social protection programmes that qualify under the November 2023 UK White Paper;
- ICF guidance on social protection mechanisms that support livelihoods, reduce income poverty, increase equity and inclusion and enhance food security. This would reduce underlying vulnerabilities to climate variability and climate shocks.

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ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR THIS STUDY

Organisation	Representatives
Danish Refugee Council	Thomas Paul Evans
Development Pathways	Bernard Wyler Stephen Kidd
FCDO	Yousuf Rafique Catherine Howgego Reham Bakir Melissa Boulter Sofia Yahya Rawan Altouqa Widad Menjra Ruba AlZubi
Humanity and Inclusion	Virginie Dattler Ashaf Kapkoor
ILO	Fernando Martinez
IWMI	Vidisha Samarasekara
Jordan River Foundation	Mohammad Hourani Taghreed Saeed Nizar Slebi Laila Juma
UK Met Office	Helen Ticehurst
UNHCR	Emanuela Paoletti Ifeani Bernard Nwankwo Mette Karlsen (via email)
UNICEF	Gemma Wilson-Clark Khamza Abdurakhimov Chisato Yanagisawa
WFP	Faten Al Hindi Corey Fortin Samar Taha

ANNEX 2: OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOBILISING FINANCE

Climate finance donors

A non-exhaustive list of opportunities for mobilising finance in support of initiatives that build the climate resilience of reguees is provided below. These will need to be examined for feasibility, given the priorities of the relevant donors/funds and funding vehicles as well as the specific HIP intervention. Donors typically have budgets for development and humanitarian funding, differing planning cycles, and differing approaches to the provision of funding. For example, some donors provide humanitarian funding bilateral contributions with a broad or strict specification of where and what their funding should be spent on by implementing organisations, such as UN agencies and international NGOs, while others offer contributions to humanitarian responses in the form of core funding for multilateral institutions.

In the case of climate finance, all providers prioritise the activities and objectives outlined in country climate planning and strategies. Therefore, unless measures are included in Jordan's NDC, NAP or climate change policies and specifically respond to climate risks, the case for financing may be challenging. Climate finance providers also need to be able to measure the impact of their investments. Therefore, interventions proposed to these providers would need to demonstrate the benefits in terms of building climate resilience, achieving climate change adaptation and mitigation, as well as the evidence of such benefits.

Finally, it is important to note that the UK is a donor to financial mechanisms such as the UNFCCC financial mechanisms and to programmes of institutions such as the World Bank. The UK was a donor to the Islamic Development Bank's Lives and Livelihoods Fund (LLF) that is included in this overview. It is recommended that FCDO Jordan engage with the FCDO MENA Department and other relevant departments/individuals within FCDO before engaging with these institutions.

UNHCR Climate Resilience Fund

The UNHCR's recently created Climate Resilience Fund aims to ensure that forcibly displaced people fleeing from or living in climate vulnerable countries are protected from and resilient to the impacts of climate change. As noted earlier, Jordan is one of the 22 priority countries covered by this fund. The fund will facilitate direct climate financing and action to reach refugees, stateless and displaced people, as well as their host communities. Activities that would be supported by the fund include but are not limited to improving shock responsive, climate-adaptive social protection and/or related humanitarian cash assistance; building climate resilient shelters; increasing access to solar energy through the expansion of solar mini-grids in refugee settings, including the solarisation of water infrastructure; and activities in coordination

and involvement with host communities that promote peaceful co-existence in the context of scarce natural resources.

The fund will be capitalised through grant contributions. It allows donors to earmark contributions either by geographic or outcome area. If the UK contributes to this fund, funding could be earmarked for Jordan. The UK could also lobby other donors to earmark contributions under this fund for Jordan.

UN OCHA's Central Emergency Response Fund

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 as the United Nations global emergency response fund. CERF enables humanitarian responders to deliver life-saving assistance during crises. CERF's window for underfunded emergencies provides grant response to scale up and sustain protracted relief operations and humanitarian response activities within an underfunded emergency.

DAC donors

DAC donors such as Canada, Denmark, EU, the European Commission, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States could be potential contributors to HIP programming in general in Jordan. The United States is already amongst the largest donors in Jordan. Some interviewees noted that funding decisions for the United States are driven by political considerations rather than development and humanitarian considerations. They also noted that influencing funding from the United States in Jordan to target specific outcomes remains nearly impossible. Nevertheless, it may be useful to engage in discussions with the USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA).

Non-DAC donors

Non-DAC donors, in particular Türkiye39 and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, could be potential contributors for HIP programming in Jordan. Besides bilateral contributions from these countries, funding could be accessed from King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSRelief), the UAE Red Crescent, which is the UAE's principal humanitarian agency, and Bahrain's Royal Humanitarian Foundation. Depending on the types of interventions, it may be possible to access specific contributions from the Saudi Fund for Development (SFFD), Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), Qatar Fund for Development, and Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.

39 In 2021 and 2022, Türkiye's voluntary reporting to OECD DAC suggests that it provided an equivalent of 0.85% and 0.65% of its GNI in humanitarian assistance. However, these reported contributions are not directly comparable with those of other donors, as the assistance largely comprises spending on hosting Syrian refugees within Türkiye.

Islamic Development Bank

Under its climate change policy and Climate Action Plan, Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) aims for climate change finance to be 35%, as a percentage of the bank's overall commitment by 2025. At COP28, IsDB committed to providing over US$1 billion in climate finance to support its member countries affected by fragility and conflict during the next three years. This financing is intended to prioritise high-impact actions, mainly adaptation finance, aligning these actions with the broader development objectives of addressing fragility. IsDB's LLF, a US$2.5 billion blended facility, could be a specific option for programmes that target healthcare and nutrition. The LLF works to lift the poorest out of poverty across 33 IsDB member countries through investments in primary health and infectious diseases, smallholder farming and rural agriculture, and basic infrastructure.

UNFCCC financial mechanisms

UNFCCC financial mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund and Global Environment Facility could also be potential opportunities to access finance. However, accessing finance from these funds requires a strong climate rationale for investments, i.e., justification of how the context of a changing climate creates additional risks that the intended project activities are clearly intended to reduce. These funds also require a focus on additionality and do not provide financing for development projects or projects that would go ahead even in the absence of climate change. The time frames for accessing funding from these funds can range from one to four years. Together, this means that not all HIP interventions would be eligible for funding from these funds, or accessing this funding could take a long time.

Foundations in the region

Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiatives (MBRGI). MBRGI is a foundation established in 2015, combining under its umbrella over 30 humanitarian and developmental initiatives and entities. Most have been launched and supported by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of UAE and Ruler of Dubai. The foundation has the stated objective of addressing pressing humanitarian, developmental and social challenges and empowering vulnerable and disadvantaged communities around the world. The foundation's humanitarian programmes are delivered under five key pillars: Humanitarian Aid & Relief, Healthcare and Disease Prevention, Spreading Education & Knowledge, Innovation & Entrepreneurship, and Empowering Communities. MBRGI's Global Humanitarian Impact Fund for Emergency Preparedness and Response could also be a potential option.

The World Bank

The World Bank has committed US$30 billion in financing for countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence, with the objective of tackling the root causes of fragility, building resilience, preserving (or rebuilding) critical institutions, and creating opportunities for refugees and host communities. This funding could provide opportunities for HIP interventions in Jordan. Together with the UN and IsDB, the World Bank has established the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) to help middle-income countries address the refugee crisis. In fact, the GCFF was established in 2016 in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Administered by the World Bank, the GCFF uses donor contributions to reduce borrowing costs for development projects that benefit refugees and host communities. The GCFF has funded development projects focused on improving the lives of refugees and host communities in Jordan.

Financing options for building climate resilience

Green bonds and climate resilience bonds

Green and climate resilience bonds, issued by public or private parties, offer Jordan the opportunity to secure the necessary funds for climate change projects.40 These bonds could assist with financing the development of sustainable water management systems, renewable energy installations, and infrastructure capable of withstanding climatic stresses. These would directly contribute to the goals of CRNI.

Impact investing and social impact bonds

Impact investing channels private capital to projects with pre-defined social and environmental outcomes while yielding financial benefits. Through this approach, governments or commissioners enter into agreements with social service providers.[41] Social impact bonds could be structured to fund initiatives that improve educational attainment, enhance public health, and support sustainable livelihoods for refugees with the framework of the CRNI.

Climate insurance

Climate insurance is an essential tool for managing the financial risks associated with extreme weather events and natural disasters. By developing tailored climate insurance products for farmers, property owners and businesses, Jordan can mitigate the economic impacts of climate variability, ensuring stability and continuity for those most at risk.[42]

40 See Qadir, U. & Pillay, K. (2021). Green bonds for climate resilience. The Netherlands: Global Center for Adaptation. Available at: https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Green-Bonds-for-Climate-Resilience_State-of-Play-and-Roadmap-to-Scale.pdf. (Accessed: 11 May 2024).

41 See Galitopoulou, S. & Noya, A. (2016). Understanding social impact bonds. OECD. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/UnderstandingSIBsLux-WorkingPaper.pdf (Accessed: 12 May 2024).

42 Warner, K. et al. (2013). Innovative insurance solutions for climate change: How to integrate climate risk insurance into a comprehensive climate risk management approach. 12. Bonn: United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). Available at: http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/unu:1850/pdf11484.pdf. (Accessed: 11 May 2024).

ANNEX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE

To be indicated upfront at interviews:

- In reporting back on the interviews, we will not attribute any findings to yourself. We report back as 'stakeholder interviews'.
- Any information you provide during the interview and any documents you share with us after the interview are treated as confidential under agreements with FCDO. Only the experts delivering the assignment will have access to it.

Notes for interviewer:

- If necessary, make it clear that we have access to FCDO programme documents and have read them. But for the purpose of the interview, please assume that we don't know about the programmes.
- Please use questions depending on answers/how the conversation goes.
- We need to probe on the climate links as much as we can. Depending on responses, please probe climate links through further questions. Will need to devise these as we get responses based on what we are hearing.
- The questionnaire is intended as a guide. Depending on findings/discussions, the questions would need to be adapted or changed.

Questions for FCDO

1. Please give us an overview of the programme including its components and activities.
2. SSERJ: The business case refers to investments in non-contributory social assistance. Could you explain what this means?
3. BRIDGE:
   - The business case refers to non-formal education. Could you explain what this means?
   - The 2023 Annual Review recommends that the ToC is revised, focusing more specifically on activities and interventions that target the most vulnerable children, including refugees, marginalised girls, out of school children, and children with disabilities. How can the focus on climate be reconciled with this recommendation?
4. JPP: The business case refers to non-formal education. Could you explain what this means?
5. What factors would motivate your consideration of incorporating climate resilience activities into the programmes?
6. Do you perceive any potential benefits of integrating climate resilience activities into the programmes? If yes, identify the benefits.
7. Are there specific gaps or areas of need within the programme that you believe climate resilience activities could address?
8. What resources or support would be necessary to effectively implement climate resilience activities within the programme?

General questions for all programmes

1. Please tell us about your role in the programme. What activities do you implement for the programme?
2. Could you give us three big learnings so far from the programme? (could be *positive negative, gaps, strengths, weaknesses, missed opportunities*)
3. Does the programme address any drivers of climate change or vulnerabilities created by climate change? If yes, could you tell us more about these drivers/vulnerabilities? If yes, could you tell us about activities that specifically address these vulnerabilities?
4. What other opportunities do you see under the programme to respond to climate shocks?
5. What would you need to deliver these activities?
6. What factors would motivate your consideration of incorporating climate resilience activities into the programmes?
7. Do you perceive any potential benefits of integrating climate resilience activities into the programmes? If yes, identify the benefits.
8. Are there specific gaps or areas of need within the programme that you believe climate resilience activities could address?
9. What resources or support would be necessary to effectively implement climate resilience activities within the programme?
10. Who specifically are the beneficiaries? How many of these are climate refugees? Out of these: first, are they refugees because they were displaced due to climate change? Was this a direct or indirect climate link? Second: Is the disruption that they currently face consistent with climate change (sudden or gradual)? Third, if the beneficiaries weren't refugees, would they be climate vulnerable?
11. Is there evidence (by way of surveys/monitoring) in support of above? We need to have credible evidence that the case load they cite in response to Q10 are credibly climate vulnerable.
12. Are there any unintended climate resilience benefits to the support being provided? (May want to probe: How did you define these as climate resilience benefits?) If yes, what are these? How do we know? i.e., is there evidence? How can this be quantified? Is there any monitoring of these unintended benefits?
13. Have you prepared any quarterly or annual reports/MEL reports? Could we get access to them?
14. Can we follow up via email if we have any other questions?

Questions specific to Strengthening Societal and Economic Resilience in Jordan (SSERJ) Programme

1. We understand that the programme intends to provide technical support to NAF and MoSD on an inclusive shock responsive social protection pillar within the NSPS, including climate-related shocks. Please tell us about the specific activities undertaken here. (If nothing has been done yet, and note that the annual report says this has not been done yet.) Why has this activity been delayed?
2. What activities are planned for this for the remainder of the programme?
3. What kind of funding has been allocated for this/is intended to be allocated for this?
4. (Depending on the activities that have been done & note that the annual report says this has not been done yet) what evidence do we have in support of the results (emerging results)?
5. How does/would the programme measure the results of this activity?
6. Could you tell us about the programme KPIs under which results for this activity would be reported?
7. The programme documents indicate that TA for monitoring and evaluation will ensure that Jordan continues to develop a robust evidence base for decision making. Does this evidence base cover climate shocks? What type of evidence base is being built in the context of climate shocks?
8. The programme KPIs include reporting on the percentage and number of social protection recipients with enhanced resilience in times of shocks or based on life cycle vulnerabilities. How do we know in reporting which shocks are being referring to? Given the multiple shocks like to be facing the intended beneficiaries, how can we differentiate? What evidence is used or how is evidence gathered to demonstrate which shocks are referred to here?
9. From your perspective, how does climate change impact the effectiveness of social protection interventions within the SSERJ programme?
10. How do you think social protection programmes can contribute to climate resilience and adaptation efforts within vulnerable communities in Jordan?
11. Do you perceive potential synergies between social protection and climate change adaptation strategies?
12. How do you perceive the intersection between climate change and humanitarian needs within the context of the SSERJ programme?
13. In what ways do you think climate change impacts the effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivery in Jordan?
14. From your perspective, what are the key gaps or weaknesses in the SSERJ programme's approach to addressing the ramifications of climate change for vulnerable populations?
15. How do you perceive the current level of integration of climate resilience considerations into the SSERJ programme's activities?
16. What is support such as cash transfers or social protection safety nets being used for? Is there evidence in support of the 'use' through surveys or monitoring?

Questions specific to Building Resilience, Inclusion and Diversity through Girls' Education (BRIDGE) Programme

1. The business case for the programme emphasises building resilience against future shocks across the public education sector. To what extent have climate shocks been considered?
2. Can you recall incidents or occasions when schools have been closed due to a climate shock or climate-related event? Does this happen frequently in Jordan?
3. The business indicates that the programme will target policy reform interventions to promote climate smart thinking within the Ministry of Education (MoE). Can you explain the programme thinking here?
4. The business case also makes provision for Flexible TA that could be used to support the MoE on aspects such as climate efficiencies in education. Can you explain the programme thinking here?
5. The annual review of 2023 indicates that no activities have been undertaken in the first year towards either of these two climate interventions. Why was this? Going forward, what activities are intended here? How would results be measured?
6. The business case for the programme emphasises the strengthening of MoE, the Research and Evidence Department, and building data and evidence to inform decision-making. What kind of data and evidence are we referring to? (Note – we want to find out if this includes links between climate shocks and education disruption.)
7. Do you perceive a relationship between climate change and the provision of adequate WASH facilities in schools? If yes, how?
8. Do you believe gender disparities in access to education intersect with the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations? If yes, in what ways do you think gender disparities in access to education intersect with the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations?
9. Do you think introducing sustainable skills development into the curriculum is important to address climate change challenges? If yes, how?
10. Considering the link between climate change and gender disparities in education, how do you think the BRIDGE programme can address the specific needs of girls and women in the context of climate resilience?
11. From your perspective, do you think climate change influences the effectiveness of educational interventions within the BRIDGE programme? If yes, how?
12. Is there evidence on what access to education and improved teaching quality is leading to? What is the improved quality of education leading to? (The idea being to find out if the education is translating into use in terms of building climate resilience.)

Questions specific to Jordan Protection Programme (JPP): Support for Vulnerable Refugees and Jordanians

1. Do you think climate change impacts the challenges faced by vulnerable populations regarding access to protection services and resources?
2. Considering the influx of migrants and refugees into urban areas due to climate-related factors, do you see any connections between this trend and the protection needs of vulnerable communities?
3. In your opinion, does climate change exacerbate social tensions and inequalities among populations accessing protection services?
4. Do you believe that capacity-building initiatives focused on climate resilience could strengthen the effectiveness of protection interventions?
5. Do you think climate induced displacement could further strain the resources available for providing protection services to vulnerable communities?

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TOWARDS CLIMATE RESILIENCE